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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis offers a discussion of the central concepts informing Michel Foucault's The History of 
Sexuality project. Through his analysis, Foucault develops concepts in a bid to understand 
individual experiences of sexuality in different historical periods. His project investigates the 
repressive and productive effects of power in determining the sexual self. He argues that power 
and knowledge created new types of sexualities from the seventeen-century onward. In addition, 
he examines ethical problems associated with sex in classical Greece and early Christianity. 
Foucault claims that sexuality is a practice of self-formation and such that sexual freedom is 
experienced through the everyday care of the self. By developing his own style of historical 
investigation, Foucault argues there are different ways of thinking about history, which do not 
simply legitimate what is already known. This thesis seeks to demonstrate how Foucault's studies 
contribute to our historical and contemporary understanding of the experience of sexuality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Michel Foucault and The History of Sexuality 
 
Despite Michel Foucault's insistence that 'sex is boring' (1983, 229), his discussion on the topic 
is anything but. His analysis includes such topics as heterosexuality and homosexuality, 
procreation and perversion, sexual austerity and sexual abstinence, sadism, sodomism, 
necrophilism, adolescent masturbation, and an elephant thrown in for good measure. In addition, 
Foucault provides a tantalising account of early philosophers and Christians who assemble an 
entire repertoire for mastering or managing sex. For some, sex is just out right evil thus to 
manage it one should not engage in it at all. For others, sex is a procreative matter that should 
occur preferably at night and whilst sober as heaven forbid the child be born a drunk. Thus 
despite Foucault's opinion that sex is boring, this thesis demonstrates Foucault's concepts of sex 
and sexuality is anything but mundane. This thesis offers a discussion of the key concepts 
Foucault develops in order to understand the experience of sexuality in different historical 
periods. In effect, this thesis seeks to demonstrate how Foucault's studies on sexuality may 
contribute to our own understanding of sexuality throughout history.  
 
Michel Foucault published his three-volume series entitled The History of Sexuality between 
1976 and 1984 (1983, 229). The first volume is titled The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 
(1990) while the second volume is titled The Use of Pleasure (1985) with the final volume 
termed The Care of the Self (1986). Each text provides a critical analysis of sexuality in a 
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particular historical period, starting with modernity, then moving back to classical antiquity, and 
lastly dealing with the centuries in and around the early Christian period. In addition, each text 
presents 'ideas and arguments' which challenge conventional understandings of sex and sexuality 
(Smart 1995, 94). In regard to his project, Foucault sees his studies on sexuality as a 
'philosophical exercise' in that the object was 'to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own 
history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently' (1985, 
9).  
 
In his first volume The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (1990), Foucault analyses the 
effects of power in determining the sexual self. He argues that since the seventeen-century, 
theoretical discussion favours the view of power as repressive and as a result, modern individuals 
have come to regard their sexuality as something which is repressed. Foucault refutes this 
hypothesis and claims that power created diverse sexualities such as the heterosexual, 
homosexual and hermaphrodite (1990, 43). In fact, he argues that the term 'sexuality' is a 
'historical construct' that was invented through 'strategies of knowledge and power' (1990, 106). 
Foucault does not give priority to 'creative individual subjects' rather he is more interested in 
how power produces one's sexuality (McHoul and Grace 1998, 37).  
 
In the second volume entitled The Use of Pleasure (1985), rather than elaborating on the 
relationship between power and sexuality in modernity, Foucault examines the 'ethical problems' 
associated with sex during classical antiquity (1985, 36). He argues that the early Greek and 
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Greco-Roman's devised a variety of techniques or 'practices of the self' to master their pleasures 
(1985, 13, 36). He suggests that there was an emphasis on moderation as opposed to 
immoderation, and self-restraint as opposed to self-indulgence in all matters concerning 
aphrodisia (pleasures). The purpose was to 'stylize' a sexual freedom which would enhance one's 
overall life (1985, 97). Through an analysis of the classical texts, Foucault examines the impact 
of ethics in determining the sexual self.  
 
Foucault's final text entitled The Care of the Self (1986), analyses sexuality in the golden age of 
Rome and early Christianity in the first and second century A.D. Foucault argues that a new 
phenomenon developed in this era which stressed that individuals 'must take care of themselves' 
through a variety of internal and external practices (1986, 43). In addition, there was an increased 
emphasis on sexual austerity during this time thus altering the way in which individuals 
experienced their sexuality. He notes that these changes are reflected in three main areas: 
medicine, marriage, and erotic literature (1986, 9). According to Foucault, it was against this 
background in which an emphasis was placed on heterosexual relations as opposed to 
homosexual relations, as it was during a time in which civil law promoted marriage and 
procreation over sexual infidelity, and heterogeneous relations over that of the love of boys 
(Foucault 1986, 39, 40, 186). 
 
Much of Foucault's work has been incorporated into post-structuralism, post-modernism, 
feminism and post-Marxism, thereby reaching readers in sociology, anthropology, English, 
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history and philosophy (Mills 2003, 1). However, it has been argued by a number of scholars 
(Bernauer and Mahon 1994; McHoul and Grace 1998; Cutting 1994; Mills 2003; Taylor 1984), 
that Foucault's overall work does not comprise of any theory as such therefore does not lend 
itself to easy or concise generalisations. For Clare O'Farrell, Foucault had the 'irritating ability to 
step into a new field and come up with ideas that forced specialists who had spent years in the 
area to significantly revise their approach' (2006, 3).  
 
Due to the vast body of scholarly writing surrounding Foucault's work, this thesis will only 
include the academic literature that addresses his historical style of analysis and his concepts on 
sexuality. Each chapter will include various points of view from sociologist, historians, and 
philosophers who either support, criticise or explain more simply Foucault's various concepts 
and his historical methodology. As the purpose of this thesis is to provide an objective discussion 
on Foucault and his work, several footnotes demonstrate some of the contradictions that reside in 
Foucault's historical point of view. The additional footnotes simply demonstrate the vast 
scholarly opinions surrounding Foucault's The History of Sexuality project.  
 
Foucault has been criticised by many scholars for his unconventional use of historical texts (J. 
Davidson 1998; A. I Davidson 1994; Cohen and Saller 1994; Dykes, 2002). In large, these 
criticisms are directed toward Foucault for failing to acknowledge his sources and for 
suppressing certain historical facts that would undoubtedly challenge his position or argument. 
James Davidson in particular, argues that Foucault regarded the ancient philosophical and 
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proscriptive texts as 'good representations of Greek concerns with sexuality' when in fact what 
the Greeks actually said about sex was not as concise and coherent as Foucault suggests (1998, 
xxiii). Yet other interpreting theorists like Thomas Flynn, argue that Foucault writes the history 
of 'problems' not 'periods' and is thus warranted in addressing only those events and practices 
which are relevant to the particular problem under analysis  (1994, 42).  
 
Furthermore, sociologists Kendall and Wickham argue that '[t]o use history in the Foucaultian 
manner is to use it to help us see that the present is just as strange as the past' such that 'history 
should not be used to make ourselves comfortable, but rather to disturb the taken-for-granted' 
(1999, 4). Thus we should not expect to find in any of Foucault's work a conventional or 
standard discussion concerning historical events. Rather as Donnelly puts forth, 'instead of 
treating the past as a prologue, as part of an easily comprehensible, continuous series of events 
unfolding into the present' Foucault 'tried to establish its radical otherness, its difference' (1986, 
17). According to Foucauldian critic Fink-Eitel, a good starting point in discussing Foucault is to 
regard his work as a 'labyrinth in a temporal respect and subject to constant change' (1992, 3). 
Armed with this advice, this thesis will provide an account of the key concepts informing 
Foucault's The History of Sexuality project. 
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The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter One will discuss Foucault's concept of 'the repressive hypothesis' which he develops in 
the first volume of The History of Sexuality entitled An Introduction (1990). Foucault argues that 
the main theory shaping how we understand sexuality is 'the repressive hypothesis' (1990, 3, 10). 
This hypothesis sees the history of modern sexuality as one of repression. Foucault claims that 
this historical view sees sexual repression developing alongside the rise of economic capitalism 
in the seventeen-century. He argues that sexual repression is seen as developing in the form of a 
censorship which operates through 'prohibition, silence and nonexistence' (1990, 6).  
 
In addition, this chapter will discuss Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis. He criticises 
this historical point of view on four accounts. He argues that it deliberately situates its historical 
context to coincide with the rise of capitalism. He claims that it draws on a 'discourse of 
oppression' to validate that sexual repression exists (1990, 7). He is further critical of individuals 
who argue that sexual repression exists. Foucault claims that these individuals are provided with 
'speakers benefits' (1990, 6). Finally, Foucault criticises the repressive hypothesis for its 
representation of power as exclusively repressive and controlling. This chapter will illustrate 
Foucault's concepts and ideas surrounding sexual repression.  
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Chapter Two will discuss Foucault's concept of 'bio-power' which he develops in The History of 
Sexuality: An Introduction (1990). Foucault develops the concept of bio-power to refute the 
repressive hypothesis. He argues that the history of modern sexuality is not one of repression but 
one in which there was an increase in sexualities which was caused by a power that developed 
around the concept of the 'body' and 'population' (1990, 144).  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section entitled 'Bio-Power' will discuss 
Foucault's concept of power and its historical context. He argues that sovereign-power 
dominated pre-industrial society and bio-power is what caused the rise of capitalism (1990, 15, 
140, 141). In addition, Foucault claims that bio-power operates in two ways: it is a disciplinary 
power that controls the human body and a regulatory power that controls the population.  
 
The second section entitled 'Bio-Power and Sexuality' will provide a discussion on how Foucault 
sees power creating new types of sexualities. Through the 'sexualization' of children, the 
'hysterization' of women and their bodies, the 'psychiatrization' of individuals considered 
perverse and the 'socialization' of the procreative couple, Foucault argues that new sexualities 
were developed (1990, 153-154). This chapter will illustrate how Foucault sees power 
determining the sexual self. 
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Chapter Three will provide a discussion on Foucault's second volume of The History of Sexuality 
entitled The Use of Pleasure (1985). In this text, Foucault argues that sex was problematic in 
classical antiquity. He claims that the early Greek and Greco-Roman's addressed these problems 
ethically through what he terms 'practices of the self' (1985, 13, 36).  
 
This chapter has two sections. The first section titled 'Problematization' will address this very 
concept of Foucault's. He describes 'problematization' as a historical form of analysis which 
examines how individuals undertake the process of problem and solution-making ([1984] 1991, 
384). In addition, he applies this type of study to analyse the way sex was problematic in both 
classical antiquity and early Christianity. He argues that both these historical periods had similar 
problems concerning sex however they differed in their way of addressing these problems.  
 
The second section titled 'Moral Problematization' will proceed with a discussion on how 
Foucault perceives sex as a moral issue in classical antiquity. He argues that there were four 
problems surrounding sex during this period. The first problem concerned moderation and excess 
in acts of pleasures (aphrodisia). The second problem concerned the use of pleasures (chresis). 
The third problem concerned the attitude toward pleasures (enkrateia). The final problem 
concerned the manner in which one seeks their goal (sophrosyne) which was to master pleasures 
through establishing a moral conduct (telos). This chapter will discuss Foucault's analysis of 
ethics and its impact on how early Greek and Greco-Roman's experienced sexuality. 
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Chapter Four will focus on Foucault's remaining volume of The History of Sexuality entitled The 
Care of the Self (1986). Foucault argues that a new phenomenon developed in the first and 
second century in which individuals were encouraged to 'take care of oneself' (1986, 43). He 
claims that this process created a 'crisis of the subject' in which there were new difficulties for 
the individual in cultivating their sexual and ethical self (1986, 95). As a result there developed 
an increased concern for sexual austerity due to the changes taking place within medicine, 
marriage and erotics (Foucault 1986, 9). 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will discuss Foucault's concept 
concerning 'the care of the self' (1986, 43). Foucault argues that the care of the self is a process 
that corresponds to medical thought in that it involves caring for the body. He suggests that it is 
also a practice that requires labour, self-knowledge and seeking a common goal. Foucault 
concludes that this culture of the self developed at the same time in which the state was 
promoting marriage and condemning adultery whilst under the leadership of Augustus (1986, 
40). 
 
The second section of this chapter entitled 'A Crisis for the Sexual Self' will discuss the ways in 
which Foucault sees a 'crisis of the subject' developing during this period' (1986, 95). He argues 
that there was an increased 'mistrust of pleasures' and thus individuals had to reinvent their 
sexual selves. He claims that these changes are reflected in three main areas: the body and 
medicine, the wife and household and lastly boys and erotic literature (1986, 39, 235). This final 
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chapter will discuss the way in which Foucault sees a culture of the self influencing the way the 
individual develops their sexuality. 
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CHAPTER ONE – Sexuality and Repression  
 
This chapter is a discussion of Foucault's concept of 'the repressive hypothesis' which is 
introduced in the opening chapter of The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (1990). Foucault 
argues that the repressive hypothesis is the main theoretical framework shaping our 
understanding of modern sexuality. This hypothesis identifies that a sexual repression developed 
in seventeenth-century industrial society, and continued into the present (Foucault 1990, 3, 10). 
Foucault claims the notion of repression is 'firmly anchored' in our contemporary civilisation and 
'weighs heavily on sex', thus he asks: 'Why do we say, with so much passion and so much 
resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are 
repressed?' (1990, 8-9).  
 
Through a critique of the repressive hypothesis, Foucault argues that sexual repression is seen as 
developing through a process of censorship which operates via 'prohibition, silence, and 
nonexistence' (1990, 6). In addition, Foucault develops four criticisms toward the repressive 
hypothesis. First, he argues the repressive hypothesis situates its historical context to coincide 
with the rise of capitalism. Second, he claims it draws on a 'discourse of oppression' to validate 
that sexual repression exists (1990, 7). Third, he presents a critical argument that some 
individuals are motivated to talk of sexual repression because it provides them with what he 
terms 'speakers benefits' (1990, 6). Lastly, Foucault examines the repressive hypothesis and 
argues it portrays power as an exclusively repressive force. This chapter will introduce 
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Foucault's concept of the repressive hypothesis which he develops in his first volume on the 
history of sexuality, In addition, this chapter includes scholarly interpretations and criticisms 
toward Foucault's studies of modern sexuality and the repressive hypothesis.  
 
The Repressive Hypothesis 
 
In his opening chapter entitled 'We Other Victorians', Foucault argues that in the context of 
sexuality, the main historical theory informing us is the 'repressive hypothesis' (1990, 10). In 
Foucault's opinion, 'we supported a Victorian regime, and we continue to be dominated by it 
even today' (Foucault 1990, 3). This historical view 'holds that through European history we 
have moved from a period of relative openness about our bodies and speech to an ever-
increasing repression and hypocrisy' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 128). Foucauldian scholars 
Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that Foucault's historical interpretation should be taken as an 
'interpretive exaggeration' or as a way of revealing 'issues to be confronted' because the concept 
of the repressive hypothesis actually enabled Foucault to later develop his own counter-
interpretation of the modern experience of sexuality (1983, 127-128)1.  
 
According to Foucault, the repressive hypothesis is situated in a particular historical context  
                                                           
1
 Dreyfus and Rabinow argue 'Foucault has clearly set up the repressive hypothesis as a deception to be revealed' 
thus 'his aim is to give a genealogy of how the repressive hypothesis came to be and what functions it has played in 
our society' (1983, 131). 
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which sees the early seventeenth-century as a period in which a degree of sexual autonomy still 
existed: 'It was a time of direct gestures, shameless discourse, and open transgressions... it was a 
period when bodies made a display of themselves' (Foucault 1990, 3). Thus a general freedom 
and tolerance still existed in the way individuals spoke about and experienced sexuality. For 
instance, the notion of privacy was generally not given consideration in the early seventeenth-
century. Foucault argues: '[s]exual practices had little need for secrecy; words were said without 
undue reticence, and things were done without to much concealment' (1990, 85). However with 
the rise of capitalism, this era of sexual liberation ceased and 'twilight soon fell upon this bright 
day, followed by the monotonous nights of the Victorian bourgeois' (Foucault 1985, 3). In 
Foucault's perception, a new phenomenon occurred in which sexuality 'was carefully confined; it 
moved into the home' when the 'conjugal family took custody of it and absorbed it into the 
serious function of reproduction' (Foucault 1990, 3). Thus sexuality is thought to have become a 
procreative practice at best, occurring exclusively in the parents' bedroom. 
 
Foucault states that the way sexual repression is perceived as occurring in the general social 
sphere is through a process of 'censorship' (1990, 6). He insists censorship during this time had 
nothing to do with 'penal law' rather it was exercised over individuals in an entirely different 
manner. Sheridan in his critique of Foucault's work, argues that this process took place in the 
form of a 'purification of the authorized vocabulary' in which '[a] new, stricter code governed 
what could be said, where, in what circumstances, and to whom' (2005, 168)2. In addition, 
                                                           
2
 Alan Sheridan in his discussion on Foucault's work suggests Foucault's aim 'is not so much to disprove the 
repressive hypothesis' but instead to demonstrate that '[r]epression is rather one effect, among others, of a complex 
set of mechanisms concerned with the production of discourse, power, knowledge' (2005, 167-168).  
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Foucault identifies three ways in which censorship is seen as establishing a repression over 
individuals and their sexualities. These three forms of censorship are defined as prohibition, 
silence and non-existence (Foucault 1990, 6). 
 
First, sexual repression developed through a form of 'prohibition'. According to Foucault, this 
occurred through a process of socially defining what was permissible sexual behaviour and 
similarly forbidden. Incidentally, the procreative couple set the standard and 'laid down the law' 
because their sexual activities had a 'utilitarian' purpose (Foucault 1990, 3) As a result, all other 
forms of sexual activity were deemed 'sterile' (Foucault 1990, 3, 34). Furthermore, those who 
engaged in alternate sexual activities were considered to display signs of 'abnormality' such as 
the village 'half-wit' who paid young girls for his sexual pleasures or the dirty Englishmen who 
recorded his sexual adventures anonymously in My Secret Life (Foucault 1990, 21, 32). 
 
The second way sexual repression resulted was through a 'rule of silence' in that, '[o]n the subject 
of sex, silence became the rule' (Foucault 1990, 3). Because the procreative couple set the norm, 
they too, 'safeguarded the truth, and reserved the right to speak while retaining the principle of 
secrecy' (Foucault 1990, 3). Thus the speaking of sex itself was seen as an exclusive practice, in 
which only the legitimate couple could participate. According to Foucault, children were not 
permitted to discuss sex which is why 'one closed one's eyes and stopped one's ear's' whenever 
they came in contact with the contrary' (1990, 4). Furthermore, sexual connotations were to be 
absent from everyday speech. Foucault argues this represents that a 'general and studied silence 
was imposed' on the subject of sex (Foucault 1990, 4). 
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The final way sexual repression occurred was through a process of 'non-existence' (Foucault 
1990, 6). Non-existence means the denial that alternate or other sexualities existed in Victorian 
society therefore sexualities deemed deviant or abnormal were endured only within 'brothels' and 
'mental institutions' (Foucault 1990, 4). In citing Steven Marcus3, Foucault argues that the 
prostitute and client including the psychiatrist and his or her patient constituted those 'other 
Victorians', because they continued to enjoy a degree of sexual autonomy by creating a space in 
which to express their alternate sexualities (1990, 4). Foucault identifies prohibition, silence and 
non-existence as products of a censorship that was imposed on individuals and their sexualities 
in early Victorian society. He argues the repressive hypothesis perceives sexual repression 
developing through these three particular forms of censorship (1990, 6). 
 
By identifying its particular elements, Foucault criticises the repressive hypothesis on four 
accounts. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, where Foucault stood in relation to his critique is 
'not explicitly clear', however they see Foucault as generally 'problematizing the way others have 
related the term' (1983, 132). Sheridan in his interpretation, claims Foucault 'is not saying that 
sex, far from being repressed in bourgeois society, has enjoyed unprecedented freedom' but 
rather his purpose was to situate the repressive hypothesis in a 'general economy of discourse on 
sex' (2005, 167). In other words, Foucault intended to demonstrate how the repressive hypothesis 
is a major theory defining our sexual experiences from the seventeen-century onward. The  
                                                           
3
 
 Steven Marcus wrote The Other Victorians: A Study of Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth Century 
England ([1888] 1966). Marcus provides an alternate view of sexuality in the Victorian era by comparing the 
official Victorian views of sexuality alongside those expressed by 'The Other Victorians', which consist of the 
sexual subcultures during this period. 
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following will discuss the four criticisms Foucault identifies with the repressive hypothesis.  
 
First, Foucault criticises the repressive hypothesis by situating its historical context alongside the 
rise of capitalism. He argues that '[b]y placing the advent of the age of repression in the 
seventeenth century, after hundreds of years of open spaces and free expression, one adjusts it to 
coincide with the development of capitalism' (Foucault 1990, 5). Foucault suggests that the 
repressive hypothesis first and foremost seeks to critique the capitalist movement, with the topic 
of sexuality remaining a secondary concern. In Dreyfus and Rabinow's interpretation: 'Sexuality 
is thus only an appendage to the real story of history – the rise of capitalism – since repression is 
the general form of domination under capitalism' (1983, 128).  
 
In addition, Foucault states that by situating the age of repression with the rise of capitalism, the 
concept of sexual repression is an 'easy one to uphold' (1990, 5). For instance, 'if sex is so 
rigorously repressed, this is because it is incompatible with the general and intensive work 
imperative' (Foucault 1990, 6). Furthermore, '[a]t a time when labor capacity was being 
systematically exploited, how could this capacity be allowed to dissipate itself in pleasurable 
pursuits, except in those - reduced to a minimum - that enabled it to reproduce itself' (Foucault 
1990, 6). Foucault rejects the idea that sex is repressed and that its singular purpose is to produce 
a workforce that fulfils the demands of the capitalist system. Mills in particular, argues Foucault 
was not trying to ignore the role of the economy in his analysis, but rather was suggesting that 
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'the ownership of property and the accumulation of capital' are not the most important elements 
in any analysis (2003, 4)4. 
 
Foucault concedes that we have not 'liberated ourselves' from perceiving the history of modern 
sexuality as a 'chronicle of increasing repression' (1990, 5). He suggests Freud may have made 
some progress in minimising sexual repression. However, he quickly dismantles this idea by 
claiming Freud enhanced sexual repression through 'the normalizing functions of psychoanalysis' 
(Foucault 1990, 5). Marxist philosopher Balibar5 argues that Foucault was attempting to 
'undermine' and 'criticise' certain problems that 'Freudo-Marxist' theorists have identified within 
our modern 'epoch' (1992, 40). For instance 'the reciprocal implication of sexual repression and 
the exploitation of the workforce in capitalist society' (Balibar 1992, 40). In Balibar's 
interpretation, Foucault was trying to 'reveal' how Marxism and psychoanalysis have over time 
evolved into the 'same field of theoretical knowledge' (1992, 41). 
 
The second issue Foucault identifies with the repressive hypothesis is a 'discourse of sexual 
oppression' (1990, 7). Throughout much of his work, Foucault uses the term discourse which he  
                                                           
4
 Mills argues Foucault was interested in a style of analysis which 'focuses on contingencies rather than simple 
relations of cause and effect' because in historical analysis 'we tend to try to attribute simple, clear causes' for 
various events or practices such as sexual repression (2003, 51). Mills further suggests Foucault interrogated such 
concepts like the economy and the self, as he saw these concepts as having their own history and motivation (2003, 
4). 
 
5 In Balibar's interpretation, 'the whole of Foucault's work can be seen in terms of a genuine struggle with Marx, and 
that this can be viewed as one of the driving forces in his productiveness' (1992, 39). 
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defines as 'reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative rules, institutionalized 
types' (2004 26). In their introduction to Foucault's philosophy, McHoul and Grace claim that 
Foucault thought of discourse in terms of 'bodies of knowledge' (1998, 26). Foucault argues that 
a discourse of oppression has two functions. One, it utilises a form of 'preaching' which 
encourages individuals to 'speak of sex in terms of repression' (Foucault 1990, 7). Two, a 
discourse of oppression causes sex to become a legitimate political issue. Foucault claims that a 
discourse of oppression encourages one to speak of sexual repression as it acts as form of 
preaching. The practice of preaching is 'familiar and important in the West', because it has long 
been a religious and cultural tradition (Foucault 1990, 7). According to Foucault, this exercise 
dates back to the theological practice of 'the sermon' and is also seen within the ancient prophetic 
texts (Foucault 1990, 8). It is a practice constituted upon a belief which sees liberation as a 
genuine possibility through ongoing resistance. According to Foucault:  
 
What sustains our eagerness to speak of sex in terms of repression is 
doubtless this opportunity to speak out against the powers that be, to utter 
truths and promise bliss, to link together enlightenment, liberation, and 
manifold pleasures; to pronounce a discourse that combines the fervour 
of knowledge, the determination to change the laws, and the longing for 
the garden of earthly delights (1990, 7). 
 
Foucault further notes that a discourse of oppression caused sex to become 'legitimately 
associated with the honor of a political cause' (1990, 6). This particular phenomenon according 
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to Foucault is caused through a series of assertions: 'the demand for sexual freedom, the 
knowledge to be gained from sex and the right to speak of sex' (Foucault 1990, 6). He argues that 
these three claims made it possible for the subject of sex to enter into the political sphere. This is 
because since the nineteenth-century, 'speaking openly and defiantly about sex is considered an 
inherently political act' according to Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 129).  
 
Thirdly, Foucault is critical of individuals who support the repressive hypothesis through their 
historical work or tautology. He claims that these individuals are motivated by what he terms 
'speakers benefit' (1990, 6). In other words, these individuals are impelled to preserve the idea 
that sexuality is repressed because in turn they are seen as 'defying established power' (Foucault 
1990, 6). In Foucault's view, 'A person who holds forth in such language places himself to an 
extent outside of the reach of power' thus it is an attractive position to be in (1990, 6).  
 
In addition, he argues that speaking about sexual repression is in itself an act of resistance and an 
'appeal to the future' (Foucault 1990, 6). For example, the speaker alludes to a future in which 
sexual liberation will be a reality. Foucault claims that this phenomenon occurs within psychiatry 
because the psychiatrist is paid to not only listen, but to reinforce the idea ones sexuality can be 
liberated from repressive forces. Thus the speaker of sexual repression may also benefit in 
monetary ways. In Foucault's view, '[t]his discourse on modern sexual repression holds up well, 
owing no doubt to how easy it is to uphold' (1990, 5). According to philosopher Taylor, Foucault 
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is 'paradoxical' in his analysis because he appears to 'bring evils to light' however at the same 
time distances himself from the idea that overcoming 'these evils promotes a good' (1986, 69).  
 
Lastly, Foucault finds fault with the repressive hypothesis for its representation of power as 
repressive. In her introductory guide to Foucault's concepts and ideas, Mills notes that Foucault 
'is very critical of the notion that power is something which a group of people or an institution 
possess and that power is only concerned with oppressing and constraining' (2003, 33). Foucault 
claims that the repressive hypothesis, or the theory of sexual repression, has a 'juridico-
discursive' perception of power (1990, 82). This means the idea of power is perceived only in 
relation to the law. Foucault states: 'it is a power whose model is essentially juridical, centred on 
nothing more than a statement of law and the operation of taboos' (1990, 85). In his critical 
analysis, Foucault argues a juridico-discursive view of power has five principle features: 
 
First, the conception of power is always a 'negative' one (Foucault 1990, 83). Power is 
understood as operating in a 'general form of limit or lack' by establishing continual boundaries 
on individuals (Foucault 1990, 83). According to Foucault, '[w]here sex and pleasure are 
concerned, power can ''do'' nothing but say no to them' (1990, 83). Power is seen as a constraint 
on sexuality which operates by 'suppressing desire, fostering false conciousness' and 'promoting 
ignorance' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 129). Couzens Hoy in his analysis of various power 
theories, suggests that Foucault is critical of explanations which see power as repressive because 
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they fail to justify the 'kinds of knowledge' that are developed and required in order to control 
and repress the human body (1986, 131)6.  
 
Second, power is perceived as operating in the form of a 'rule' in that 'power acts by laying down 
the law' by defining what is legal as opposed to illegal (Foucault 1990, 83). Sex itself is placed in 
a binary system of 'licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden' (Foucault 1990, 83). For instance, in 
early Victorian society, illicit sexual acts included rape, incest, adultery, bestiality, sodomy and 
in some cases homosexuality (Foucault 1990, 38). However Foucault argues it was 'matrimonial 
relations' that were especially 'saturated with prescriptions', 'rules and recommendation' (1990, 
37). For instance, the couple must have parental consent to marry, they must have conjugal sex 
on their wedding night, they must not must not 'seek strange pleasures' or commit infidelity and 
the marital couple must procreate (Foucault 1990, 38). Thus Foucault argues that this form of 
power 'resides in the function of legislator' by establishing what is legal and illegal in regards to 
sex and sexualities (1990, 83).  
 
Third, power is understood as a form of 'prohibition' dictating what one should and should not 
do. Foucault sees this process occurring in the form of 'thou shalt not touch, thou shalt not 
consume, thou shalt not experience pleasure, thou shalt not show thyself... except in darkness  
                                                           
6
 Couzens Hoy investigates power theories pertaining to Foucault, Steven Lukes and the Frankfurt School. He 
argues Foucault's view of power challenges Marx and neo-Marxian theories as they 'omit altogether an account of 
how it is possible for the human body even to be constructed as labour power' (1986, 130) 
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and secrecy' (1990. 84). Power is essentially seen as repressing sex 'through a taboo that plays on 
the alternative between two nonexistences' (Foucault 1990, 84). The first 'nonexistence' denies 
that other or alternate sexualities exist. The second non-existence prohibits those other 
sexualities from existing in the first place. According to Foucault, deviant sexualities that exist 
are subject to the penalty of being 'suppressed' or at best endured only within brothels and mental 
institutions (1990, 4, 84).  
 
'Censorship' is the fourth feature Foucault identifies in a juridico-discursive perspective of 
power. As previously noted, Foucault sees censorship as taking three forms: 'affirming that such 
a thing is not permitted' (prohibition), 'preventing it from being said' (silence), and lastly 'denying 
that it exists' (nonexistence) (1990, 3-6, 84). Foucault notes that within this context, power 'only 
has the force of negative on its side' and is 'capable of only posting limits' on our freedom (1990, 
85).  
 
The fifth principle feature identified by Foucault is that power is seen as having an overall 
'uniformity' (Foucault, 1990, 84). Power is seen as operating within all social institutions and 
impacting on all aspects of social life. Power over sex 'is exercised in the same way and at all 
levels' (Foucault 1990, 84). In Sheridan's interpretation, 'Foucault does not deny the fact of 
repression; what he rejects is a view of power as monolithic, centralized, and repressive' (2005, 
168). Foucault perceives this particular form of power working in the following manner:  
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[I]t operates according to the simple and endlessly reproduced 
mechanisms of law, taboo, and censorship: from state to family, from 
prince to father, from the tribunal to the small change of everyday 
punishments, from the agencies of social domination to the structures that 
constitute the subject himself, one finds a general form of power (1990, 
85). 
 
Foucault argues that a 'juridico-discursive' view of power is the major one adopted in modern 
Western political thought (1990, 82-83). He claims that it dates back to the Middle Ages and 
later enabled the very development of Western monarchy systems. According to Foucault, the 
Western monarchies were 'constructed on systems of law, they expressed themselves through 
theories of law and they made their mechanisms of power work in the form of law' (1990, 87). In 
addition, he concludes that this perception of power remains 'under the spell of the king' and 
suggests we must 'conceive of sex without the law, and power without the king' (1990, 88, 91).  
 
This chapter has introduced Foucault's concept of 'the repressive hypothesis' which he develops 
in The History of Sexuality (1990). It has been demonstrated that Foucault rejects the idea that 
sexual repression developed in the seventeenth-century and continued into the present. He claims 
that sexual repression is a phenomenon understood as occurring through a censorship which 
promotes 'prohibition, silence and nonexistence' in regards to other or alternate sexualities. He 
identifies four reasons why he refutes this historical theory. First, because it coincides sexual 
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repression with the rise of capitalism. Second, because it draws on a 'discourse of oppression' 
which uses the ancient practice of preaching to aid the belief of future sexual liberation. In 
addition, a discourse of oppression causes sex to become politicised. Foucault further criticises 
the individuals who claim that sexual repression is a reality in our society as he considers it an 
attractive opinion that provides the individual with diverse benefits. And lastly, Foucault refutes 
the repressive hypothesis by arguing it perceives power as an extension of law. For Foucault, this 
view of power is the underlying one informing Western political thought and furthermore the 
main one informing the idea a sexual repression developed in seventeenth-century industrial 
society. 
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CHAPTER TWO - Sexuality and Power 
 
This chapter discusses Foucault's concept of 'bio-power' and its relationship to sexuality which is 
developed in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (1990). Foucault formulates a theory of 
power to refute the repressive hypothesis, which claims that sexual repression has developed 
throughout the past three centuries (1990, 143). He concludes that the 'techniques of power' 
during these periods did not repress sex, rather power is what created new sexualities like 
heterosexuality and homosexuality (1990, 12). In addition, Foucault argues that the term 
'sexuality' did not exist until the eighteenth-century, and that is was invented through 'strategies 
of knowledge' such as medicine and psychiatry, and 'systems of power' such as rules and 
constraints (1990, 105-106). He claims that 'sexuality' is 'the name that can be given to a 
historical construct' (1990, 105). 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections: 'Bio-Power' and 'Bio-Power and Sexuality'. The first 
section will introduce Foucault's concept of power. He argues that bio-power developed in the 
seventeenth-century and created the rise of the capitalist economy. He claims that pre-industrial 
society was dominated by 'sovereign-power' (1990, 15) In addition, he argues that bio-power 
works in two ways: as a disciplinary power that dominates the human body and as a regulatory 
power which dominates the population (1990, 145). In Foucault's argument, power does not 
repress, rather it controls individuals and the social body in order to 'normalize society' (1990, 
144). 
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The second section will discuss bio-power and sexuality. Foucault claims that bio-power 
constructed new sexualities through the following process: the 'sexualization of childhood' - the 
'hysterization of women' - the 'psychiatrization of perversions' and - the 'socialization of 
procreative behaviour (1990, 153-154). As a result, he argues that bio-power created new and 
diverse forms of sexuality such as the 'the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the 
Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult' (1990, 105). 
 
Bio-Power 
 
In his chapter entitled 'Right of Death and Power over Life' Foucault introduces his concept of 
'bio-power' (1990, 143). Foucault argues that a process took place in the seventeenth-century in 
which the state developed an acute interest in the health and well-being of its citizens. Alongside 
this process, he claims that a new form of political power developed which was concerned with 
dominating the biological aspects of human life. Foucault terms this political power 'bio-power' 
and argues it 'brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculation and made 
knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life' (1990, 143). He concludes that the 
purpose of bio-power is not to repress life but 'to take charge of life' in order to normalize society 
(1990, 144). Philosopher Charles Taylor7, defines Foucault's analysis as an 'unmasking' in which 
                                                           
7
 Charles Taylor sees confusion and contradictions in Foucault's concept of power, freedom and truth, which he 
discusses through an examination of The History of Sexuality and Foucault's prior text Discipline and Punish (1986). 
He concludes that Foucault wanted to 'discredit' the 'very idea of liberation from power' (1986, 92). 
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'[h]e lays bare a modern system of power which is both more all-penetrating and much more 
insidious than previous forms' (1986, 69).  
 
Before the seventeenth-century, Foucault claims that the main form of power exercised over 
individuals and the social body was 'sovereign power' (1990, 135). At its most extreme form, 
sovereign power is 'the right to decide life and death' in which the sovereign leader or crowned 
head had the ultimate capacity to administer a death sentence or coerce his or her citizens into 
war (Foucault 1990, 135) Foucault asserts that sovereign power originated in early Roman 
society and was employed through the law of 'patria potestas' (Foucault 1990, 135). This law 
enabled the father of a Roman family the right to 'dispose' of the life of child or slave, 'just as he 
had given life, so he could take it away' (Foucault 1990, 135). Early classical scholar William 
Smith8 however suggests that this law was only permissible on the condition the life or status of 
the father or master could be improved, and not made worse by such an act (Smith [1842] 874). 
By the late sixteenth-century, sovereign-power had decreased in severity, in which the right over 
life and death was employed only when the head of state was under attack by internal or external 
forces.  
 
By the beginning of the seventeenth-century, Foucault claims that a rapid change occurred in the  
                                                           
8
 In 1842, William Smith published his Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities which is a 1,300 page 
compendium of information on the classical world. His text contains information on laws, architecture, the military, 
festivals, art including clothing and furniture see http://www.ancientlibrary.com/smith-dgra/ 
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overall workings of power in which, 'the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence 
of the sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population' (1990, 137). Power was no 
longer solely employed for the survival of the sovereign, rather it is employed for the survival of 
the entire social body (Foucault 1990, 142). Taylor argues Foucault's analogy develops around 
the ideas of 'power/domination' and 'disguise/illusion' (1986, 69). He claims that Foucault saw 
'the old power' as providing individuals with a degree of invisibility as it relied on 'public space' 
and a 'public authority' in order to function. This 'new power' however scrutinised the lives of all 
individuals as it 'does away with the notion of public space; power no longer appears, it is 
hidden' and thus works in the form of a 'universal surveillance' (Taylor 1986, 74).  
 
Foucault stresses that the purpose of this new power was not to repress but to 'ensure, sustain, 
and multiply life, to put this life in order' (1990, 138). This process of preserving and prolonging 
all human life had nothing to do with humanitarian sentiments, rather it developed in a particular 
historical moment when new economic developments were taking place, namely - the rise of 
industrial capitalism. Sociologist Barry Smart, argues that this 'pastoral' or 'caring' form of power 
is presented by Foucault as the defining aspects enabling 'the diffusion of capitalist economic 
relations throughout social life (1995, 102). In other words, Foucault sees bio-power as the 
fundamental and necessary precursor of capitalism. Thus in Foucault's historical interpretation:  
 
This bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the 
development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible  
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without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinary of 
production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to 
economic processes (1990, 140-141). 
 
Starting in the seventeenth-century, Foucault argues that bio-power developed in two distinct 
forms: disciplinary and regulatory (1990, 130). The first form of power was 'tied to the 
disciplines of the body' whilst the second form 'was applied to the regulation of populations' 
(Foucault, 1990, 145). Thus Foucault argues that a new phenomenon developed in which 'an 
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the 
control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of "bio-power"' (1990, 149). The 
following will discuss how Foucault sees power operating over individuals and populations.  
 
First, Foucault argues that power is a force that dominates in the form of an 'intensification of the 
body' (1990, 107). In the seventeenth-century, he claims power 'centred on the body as a 
machine' in that the body was seen as something which could be improved and utilised more 
effectively (Foucault 1990, 139). Foucauldian scholars Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest that human 
beings within this domain were considered a 'resource' however only insofar as they could 
'contribute to the strength of the state' (1983, 13). Foucault argues that this power was concerned 
with dominating the following aspects of the human body: 'its disciplining, the optimization of 
its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, 
its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls (1990, 139). 
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Foucault claims that the way the human body was dominated was through 'disciplines' (1990, 
139). Disciplines refer to the way in which the body is 'manipulated, shaped, trained' and in turn 
'obeys, responds, becomes skillful, and increases its forces' (Foucault 1977, 139). In another text 
by Foucault, notably Discipline and Punish (1977), the soldier to used to illustrate this process. 
A variety of disciplinary measures are taken to ensure the soldier has proper stance, correct 
posture and appropriate gestures when in marching or using weaponry (1977, 135). Furthermore, 
Foucault suggests that disciplinary power is 'embodied' in other institutions' such as universities, 
secondary schools, and the workplace, including medical and administrative institutions. He 
argues that all these places represent a space in which the body is carefully manipulated and 
disciplined (Foucault 1990, 140-141).  
 
Second, Foucault claims that power is a force which controls the 'species body' or 'population' 
(1990, 25). He argues that one of the major 'innovations in the eighteenth century was the 
'emergence of population' (1990, 25). This particular process developed when: '[g]overnments 
perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people," but with 
"population," with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life 
expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation (1990, 
25). 
 
In addition, the way in which the population was controlled was through what Foucault terms 
'regulatory controls' (1990, 139). This refers to the process in which the state collected statistical  
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data on all biological matters concerning the social body, including all possible variables. In due 
process, regulatory controls were put in place. For instance, surveillance systems were installed 
to monitor populations, and medical examinations became a standard norm. Furthermore 
Foucault argues that there was 'extremely meticulous orderings of space' (Foucault 1990, 145). 
Garland in his text Punishment and Modern Society (1991)9, suggests this latter form of 
regulatory control was most clearly depicted for Foucault in Jeremy Bentham's architectural 
design of the 'Panopticon' prison (1991, 146). Bentham's prison was designed with a central 
inspection tower, so inmates at all times were to be visually seen by their guards. This continual 
visibility was supposedly designed to increase vulnerability which 'induces self-control' on 
'behalf of inmates' (Garland 1991, 146). For Foucault, this represented the 'perfection of power' 
as the inmates are 'caught up in a power relation in which they are the bearers' (1977, 201).  
 
Foucault claims that these two distinct forms of power (disciplinary and regulatory) remained 
separate until the nineteenth-century in which they combined to form a 'bio-power' which is 
recognisable within our own contemporary period (1990, 144-145)10. In addition, he claims that 
sex is what united these two forms of power in the nineteenth-century because 'sex was a means 
of access to the life of the body and the life of the species. It was employed as a standard for the 
disciplines and as a basis for regulation' (1990, 14). He concludes that power does not repress,  
                                                           
9
 According to Garland, Foucault also saw this regulatory process as a form of 'normalization' because this method 
of surveillance was concerned with correction not punishment, thus incidents of non-conformity were dealt with by 
sanctions that involved 'exercises and training' designed to 'bring conduct into line' and induce self-control (1991, 
145). 
 
10
 Taylor (1986, 74) including Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 134), similarly agree that this type of power is 
characteristic of our contemporary society in that a variety of surveillance systems and are set up in order monitor 
and record a variety of human enterprises. 
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rather it controls individuals and the social body in order to 'normalize society' (1990, 144).  
 
Bio-Power and Sexuality 
 
Foucault argues that bio-power did not repress sexuality, rather it created a 'proliferation of 
sexualities' from the nineteenth-century onward (1990, 48)11. He claims that the way in which 
power constructed new sexualities was through the medical, political and administrative 
community who at the time were preoccupied with the sex of children, women and men (1990, 
103). As such, these institutions defined what was normal as opposed to abnormal in regards to 
sexual behaviour (Foucault 1990, 144). Thus Foucault argues that the increase of sexualities was 
invented through both 'systems of power' and 'strategies of knowledge' (1990, 105-106). Dreyfus 
and Rabinow describe this as a process in which 'knowledge and power combined in a specific 
mechanism constructed around sexuality' (1983, 171). 
 
In addition, Foucault claims that in order for bio-power to 'take charge of life', sex had to be 
'managed, inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good' and 'made to function 
according to an optimum' (1990, 24, 143). Thus sex itself became the source in which power 
could control both the individual and the population simultaneously. Foucault argues that 
because sex had to function to an optimum, 'four great lines of attack' were made on individuals  
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 Foucauldian scholar Barry Smart suggests, Foucault's idea of power needs to be 'conceptualized not in terms of 
repression and law but in terms of positive and productive social technologies, associated tactics, and strategies' 
(1991, 203). 
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and their bodies (1990, 146). Furthermore, each line of attack was constructed by both 
disciplinary and regulatory power. Foucault describes these attacks as developing through the 
'sexualization of childhood', the 'hysterization of women', the 'psychiatrization of perversions' 
and lastly the 'socialization of procreative behaviour (1990, 153-154).  
 
The first line of attack was on children and their bodies. According to Foucault, in the 
eighteenth-century, a great deal of discussion developed around the topic of children and their 
sexuality. Children 'posed physical and moral' including 'individual and collective dangers' 
across the entire social spectrum (Foucault 1990, 104). Such threatening adolescents included 
'children wise beyond their years, precocious little girls' and 'ambiguous schoolboys' and 
Foucault claims that a great campaign developed in order to end this 'epidemic menace' (1990, 
40, 104).  
 
Foucault argues that this campaign developed new 'strategies' to deal with children and their 
sexualities (Foucault 1990, 105). One strategy included new architectural developments designed 
to segregate the two sexes. For instance, education institutions were constructed to include boys 
and girls dormitories and restrooms. Another strategy included forcing children to speak about 
sex. Those involved in this process included parents, teachers, doctors, administrators and 
psychologists. Foucault argues that the whole purpose of this ordeal was in order to develop a 
'science' on children's sexuality (1990, 104). He terms this science a 'pedagogization of children's 
sex' in which the sex of children is a source of both medical and political interest (1990, 104). 
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The second line of attack was on women and their bodies. Foucault claims that this offence on 
women's bodies occurred in three ways. First, the female body was studied and 'analysed' by the 
medical community as it was considered the key source that ensured the survival of the 
population and the 'safeguarding of society' (Foucault 1990, 104, 147). Second, the female body 
was 'qualified' as biologically responsible for the health and well-being of children (Foucault 
1990, 104). Foucault claims that this responsibility for mothers lasted 'throughout the entire 
period of their child's education' (1990, 104). Third, the female body was 'disqualified' by the 
medical community when it posed a threat to the survival of the human species (Foucault 1990, 
104). Foucault claims that there was a variety of pathologies associated exclusively with women. 
He defines this process as the 'hysterization of women's bodies' and argues that the 'nervous 
woman constituted the most visible form of this hysterization' (1990, 104). Thus some women 
were seen as compromising the survival of the social species. Foucault concedes that the body of 
woman was 'thoroughly saturated with sexuality' because it went through a threefold process in 
which it was 'analysed', 'qualified' and 'disqualified' (1990, 104). 
 
The third line of attack was on couples and their fertility. According to Foucault, a number of 
measures were taken by the medical community to ensure couples were fertile, as they were 
responsible for maintaining the survival of the population (1990, 104). Dreyfus and Rabinow 
argue that this process demonstrates how the 'conjugal couple' were given both 'medical and 
social responsibilities' (1983, 172). Foucault claims that a number of theories developed 
concerning the matter of birth-control. 
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First, a theory of 'degenerescence' developed which concerned the biological processes of life 
such as genetics. This theory concerned what type of off-spring one would produce according to 
hereditary factors. Foucault argues that these doctors supposedly treated homosexuality as a 
perversion which was brought on by the illnesses afflicting ones ancestors (1990, 118). Second, 
a 'eugenics movement' developed in which early eugenicists such as Sade were concerned with 
'perfecting the species' by studying an analysing blood (1990, 148). Foucault claims that the 
study of blood was an aristocratic movement which eventually led to a 'eugenic ordering of 
society' in which individuals across the entire world were categorised into races. Foucault terms 
this overall process as the 'socialization of procreative behaviour' in which an attack was made 
upon the procreative couple (1990, 104). And the final line of attack was on individuals and their 
sexuality and occurred in the form of an 'incorporation of perversions' (1990, 42). Foucault 
defines this process as the 'setting apart the ''unnatural'' as a specific dimension' in the field of 
sexuality (1990, 39). The way this occurred was by defining sexual behaviour as either normal as 
opposed to abnormal thus, '[a]ll behaviour could now be classified along a scale of normalization 
and pathologization' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 173). Foucault argues this process is most 
clearly depicted in texts written by nineteenth-century doctors and psychiatrists who developed 
an entire new system for classifying sexual behaviour. For instance 'there was Krafft-Ebing's 
zoophiles and zooerasts, Rohleder's auto-monosexualists; and later, mixoscopophiles, 
gynecomasts, presbyophiles, sexoesthetic inverts and dyspareunist women' (Foucault 1990, 43). 
Foucault argues 'the growth of perversions is not a moralizing theme' rather he sees it as 'the real 
product of the encroachment of a type of power on bodies and their pleasures' (1990, 48). 
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In summarising, Foucault sees four major attacks occurring on the individual body during the 
nineteenth-century, noteably an attack on 'the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the 
Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult' (1990, 105). In Mill's opinion, rather than 'closing 
down' certain types of sexualities, Foucault saw the 'repressive discourses' during the time as 
actually creating apparently 'perverse forms of sexuality' (2003, 85). Foucault claims that this 
process represents how the sex of children, men and women was a 'preoccupation' for medical, 
political and administrative staff from the nineteenth-century onward (1990, 103). He argues that 
the result of this process creating a defining of the normal as opposed to abnormal in the matter 
of individual sexuality and concludes that a 'normalizing society is the historical outcome of a 
technology of power centred on life' (Foucault 1990, 144). 
 
In conclusion, in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Foucault developed his studies 
around refuting the idea that sexuality has been repressed from the seventeen-century onward. 
Instead he argues that the modern period is 'the age of multiplication: a dispersion of sexualities' 
and a 'strengthening of their disparate forms' (1990, 37). In Foucault's opinion, the term 
'sexuality' did not exist until the nineteenth-century and the reason it does is due to 'fields of 
knowledge' dealing with sex and 'systems of power' which constrain sex. In Foucault's opinion, 
these processes enabled the 'very production of sexuality' and the term 'sexuality' 'is thus 'the 
name that can be given to a historical construct' (1990, 105). 
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This chapter has introduced Foucault's concept of 'bio-power' which he develops in the first 
volume entitled The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (1990). It has been shown that 
Foucault sees bio-power developing in the seventeenth-century which in effect caused the rise of 
economic capitalism. Before this period, he claims sovereign-power was the main form of power 
exercised over state citizens. Furthermore this chapter has included a discussion on how Foucault 
sees bio-power operating in two ways: via a disciplinary power concerned with controlling the 
human body, and a regulatory power concerned with controlling the population. And lastly, this 
chapter has demonstrated how Foucault sees an increase of sexualities developing in the 
nineteenth-century through four lines of attacks on individuals and their sexuality: The first and 
second attack was on children and women's sexuality. The third attack was on the procreative 
couple and the last attack was made on those that were considered perverted. In conclusion, 
Foucault argues the term sexuality is a nineteenth-century invention which was developed 
through a definitional process, in which the normal and pathological was clearly defined. His 
overall argument is sexual repression did not develop in the seventeenth-century, rather there 
was an increase of diverse forms of sexualities. Thus he perceives modernity as a period which 
created and constructed new and diverse forms of sexuality such as 'the hysterical woman, the 
masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult' (1990, 105). 
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CHAPTER THREE – Issues with Sex  
 
This chapter explores Foucault's concept of 'problematization' which he develops in his second 
volume of The History of Sexuality entitled The Use of Pleasure (1985). Foucault argues sex was 
an 'ethical problem' in Greek and Greco-Roman society during fourth century B.C (1985, 36). He 
claims that this phenomenon is portrayed within various ancient texts which discuss a variety of 
issues relating to human sexuality. Foucault argues that this demonstrates a 'problematization of 
sexuality' during classical antiquity (1985, 13, 36). In addition, he suggests the way of dealing 
with these problems was ethical and occurred through a form of 'moral reflection' which he terms 
'practices of the self' (1985, 11-13, 92). Through a critique of the ancient texts, Foucault 
concludes that the purpose of practices of the self was to 'stylize' a sexual freedom which would 
ultimately result in one's life becoming an oeuvre (1985, 13, 97). This practice of 'self-formation' 
according to Bernauer and Mahon can be essentially understood as 'the way we fashion our 
freedom' (1994, 143). 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections entitled 'Problematization' and 'Moral Problematization 
of Pleasures'. The first section will discuss the concept of problematization which Foucault 
identifies as a historical form of analysis which examines the process of both problem and 
solution-making ([1984] 1991, 388). Following this will be a discussion on how Foucault sees 
sex as problematic in both classical antiquity and early Christianity. Foucault claims that in each 
era there were similar problems surrounding the practice of sex, notably a concern around the 
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following themes: fear, conduct, image and abstinence. 
 
The second section of this chapter will discuss what Foucault terms a 'moral problematization of 
pleasure' in classical antiquity. Foucault claims that there are four themes within the classical 
texts that demonstrate sex was a moral and 'ethical problem during this period' (1985, 36). First, 
the theme of aphrodisia which means sexual pleasures. Second the theme of chresis, which 
refers to the use of sexual pleasures. Third, the theme of enkrateia, which is the attitude one 
adopts toward pleasures. The last theme Foucault identifies is sophrosyne, which is the goal one 
seeks to obtain in their use of pleasures through telos which is the process one undergoes in order 
to establish a moral conduct.  
 
Problematization 
 
In an interview with Rabinow and conducted shortly before his death, Foucault characterised his 
current work as 'problematization' ([1984] 1991, 384). This term refers to an analysis of 'what 
has made possible the transformation of the difficulties and obstacles of a practice into a general 
problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions' (Foucault [1984] 1991, 389). This is 
a form of analysis concerned with how problem and solution-making is conducted by the 
individual. In addition, Foucault further claims that problematization is a practice in which the 
individual steps back from their everyday life in order to analyse their actions as an 'object of 
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thought'. The purpose of this process is to question the 'meaning', 'condition' and 'goal' 
underlying particular 'objects of thought' which in turn influences ones actions (Foucault [1984] 
1991, 388). This process of problematization, according to Flynn12 is simply a 'charting the 
experience in question' (1994, 38). 
 
Foucault argues that in order to commence his studies on sexuality in early antiquity 'it was 
necessary to locate the areas of experience and the forms in which sexual behaviour is 
problematized, becoming an object of moral concern' (1985, 23-24). In other words, Foucault's 
analysis attempts to isolate the ways in which sex is problematic in history and to determine the 
kind of practices of the self that developed in response to these problems. Bernauer and Mahon 
suggest Foucault was investigating a 'historical ontology of ourselves' and the manner in which 
we 'fashioned ourselves as ethical subjects' (1994, 148). Foucault situates his historical analysis 
by arguing that the problems with sex in early antiquity were similar with those in early 
Christianity. He identifies four key similarities between each historical period in which sex was 
problematic. These problems are defined as: fear, conduct, image and abstinence. 
 
First, a general 'fear' of the sexual act itself existed in both societies. In the Christian tradition, 
individuals connected 'pleasure to the realm of the devil' thus a genuine fear circulated around its  
                                                           
12
 Thomas Flynn in mapping Foucault's historical methods, suggests problematization enabled Foucault to write the 
history of a 'problem' rather than of a 'period' which freed him of the 'obligation to exhaustive research of historical 
sources' (1994, 42). 
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practice (Foucault 1985, 16). Whereas in classical antiquity, early Greeks like Soranus believed 
sexual pleasure was more detrimental to health than 'virginity and plain abstinence' (Foucault 
1985, 16). Thus individuals in Greek society were generally fearful of the illnesses they believed 
the 'illicit use of sex' would bring about (Foucault 1985, 16). Such illicit practices included 
excess sexual activity and onanism (masturbation).  
 
Second, the idea of 'conduct' constituted a concern in both historical periods. For instance, early 
Christians were encouraged to exercise 'virtue' and 'good morals' in their sexual conduct 
(Foucault 1985, 17). This notion of conduct was supposedly handed down from the Greeks who 
emphasised the notion of 'inner strength' and 'self-mastery' over sexual desires (Foucault 1985, 
17). Early Greeks like Saint Francis of Sales urged his disciples to exercise sexual virtue and 
fidelity in the same manner in which the elephant does. For example, the elephant has good 
sexual virtue by mating only every three years with the same partner and also practises good 
hygiene by bathing straight after sexual intercourse. Foucault claims that each era was concerned 
with an 'ideal of conduct' in matters of sexual practice (1985, 17).  
 
Third, the idea of 'image' was a genuine problem surrounding sex in both the early Greek and 
later Christian epoch. Foucault argues that this is most readily understood as a fear of 
stigmatisation or stereotyping in which a 'natural stigma' is attached to certain visual sexual 
representations such as homosexuals who dress and act like women (1985, 19-21). He claims 
that this particular sexual image was a source of negative judgement by others in both historical 
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periods and suggest that a stigma is still attached to this sexual imagery in contemporary 
Western society. Foucault argues that an overall anxiety and fear of certain sexual images has 
troubled individuals not only in classical antiquity and Christianity but throughout all historical 
periods (Foucault 1985, 19-20).  
 
Lastly, the notion of sexual 'abstinence' in which the individual renounces sexual activity, is a 
'familiar figure in Christianity' and 'equally known in pagan antiquity' (Foucault 1985, 20). 
Foucault notes that sexual abstinence in Christianity was exercised for religious purposes in 
which virginity was seen as an practice which would 'give access to a spiritual experience of 
truth and love that sexual activity excludes' (Foucault 1985, 20). The practice of sexual 
renunciation in classical antiquity however was popular amongst athletes who were committed to 
exercising 'self-restraint' over sexual cravings (Foucault 1985, 20). Others who engaged in sexual 
abstinence during this time were motivated by the idea it would lead them to a higher source of 
truth or knowledge. 
 
Thus Foucault conceives sex as being problematic in both Greco-Roman and Christian societies 
in which fear, image, conduct and abstinence were the primary concerns informing how one 
experienced sexuality. He warns however, '[i]t would be a mistake to infer that the sexual 
morality of Christianity and that of paganism form a continuity' (1985, 20-21). In that it would 
be an error to see a similar motivation informing how individuals experienced sexuality in both 
historical periods.  
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Foucault argues that the early Christians experienced sexuality through 'codes of behaviours' in 
which sexual austerity was 'imposed' on all individuals in the same manner by the rules and 
values developed by the Church (1985, 21). Arnold Davidson13, who discusses Foucault's 
historical methods of analysis, suggests that Foucault understood this to be a 'moral code' which 
consists of 'the rules that determine which actions are forbidden, permitted, or required' (1994, 
228). Foucault claims that '[t]he Church and the pastoral ministry stressed the principles of a 
morality whose precepts were compulsory and whose scope was universal' (Foucault 1985, 21). 
 
The Greeks and Greco-Roman's however, experienced sexuality through 'forms of subjectivity' 
in which the rules and values during the time were 'proposed' and 'transmitted in a diffuse 
manner' (Foucault 1985, 25, 29). With regards to sexual austerity, individuals were encouraged 
to develop 'self-reflection', 'self-knowledge' and self-examination' as there was no overall 
institution or system determining how one should behave and act in their sexual activities 
(Foucault 1985, 29). Cohen, in his studies of classical antiquity, suggests there did in fact exist a 
legal governance informing how one should behave. He sees this represented in the law of 
hubris' which forbad a variety of 'sexual misconducts' including 'rape', 'sexual aggression' and 
'violations of sexual honour' (Cohen, 1991, 172-173)14. 
 
                                                           
13
 Arnold Davidson argues Foucault examination of ancient sexuality is first and foremost a study of ethics. He is 
critical of scholars who attack Foucault for his use and interpretation of the ancient texts because he visualises 
Foucault's ethics as a way to 'write history' (1994, 116) 
 
14
 Cohen in his article entitled Sexuality, Violence, and the Law of Hubris suggests a more thorough account of the 
'social context and moral psychology of the ideology, social practices, and legal prosecutions involving hubris 
would make a fundamental contribution to out understanding of Athenian society' (1991, 171) 
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In summarising, Foucault argues that there were similarities and differences in the way in which 
early Greeks and later Christian's problematized sex. However, he asserts the major difference 
between these two epochs is that within classical antiquity 'the demands for sexual austerity were 
not organized into a unified, coherent, authoritarian moral system that was imposed on everyone 
in the same manner; they were more in the nature of a supplement' (1985, 21). Regarding this 
analogy, Arnold Davidson suggests Foucault ultimate aim was to elaborate a theory of ethics 'as 
a framework for interpreting these Greek and Roman problematizations of sex' (1994, 117-118).  
 
The Moral Problematization of Pleasures 
 
In the chapter entitled 'The Moral Problematization of Pleasures' Foucault argues that the 
'manner' in which early Greek and Athenians enjoyed pleasure 'was considered by them to be an 
ethical problem' (1985, 36). He claims that in classical ethics, an emphasis 'is placed on the 
relationship with the self that enabled a person to keep from getting carried away by the appetites 
and pleasures, to maintain a mastery and superiority over them' (1985, 31). Arnold Davidson 
claims 'Foucault took ethics to be one part of the study of morals' and thus his concept of ethics 
means the 'study of the self's relation to itself' (1994, 228). Notably, Foucault warns readers that 
ethics in classical antiquity was a 'male ethics' which was 'made by men for men' (1985, 47). 
Thus he argues that a male ethics was developed to counteract the various problems associated 
with sex during classical antiquity15. 
                                                           
15
 In her critical guide to Foucault's work, Sarah Mills argues that Foucault is a 'very androcentric, or male-
orientated thinker' as his analysis of classical ethics is essentially a 'male-orientated ethics' that excludes women 
(2003, 7) 
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Foucault argues that there were four ways in which sex was problematic during this period. First, 
there were concerns regarding sexual pleasure (aphrodisia). Second, there were issues 
concerning how one should perform acts of pleasure (chresis). Third, there were problems 
regarding the attitude one should adopt in dealing with pleasure (enkrateia). And finally, 
Foucault argues there existed a concern regarding sophrosyne, which is the goal one seeks to 
obtain in their use of pleasures though the process of telos which is what one does in establishing 
a moral conduct. The following discussion will demonstrate how Foucault sees sex as 
problematic in classical antiquity. 
 
Foucault argues that the term aphrodisia in classical antiquity means the 'acts, gestures, and 
contacts that produce a certain form of pleasure' (1985, 40). He notes there is a difficulty in 
defining this term outside of sexual pleasures, as there is no long list describing what constitutes 
acts of aphrodisia. He includes food and wine to the list of Greek and Roman pleasures because 
they are discussed in the ancient texts, thus he argues there were problems concerning their use. 
Similarly, James Davidson16 in his study on the 'consuming passions' in antiquity argues that sex, 
food and drinking were three ways in which individuals derived a 'bodily gratification' (1998, 
xvi). In addition, Foucault claims that aphrodisia was a 'domain of moral concern' during 
classical antiquity, due to two specific issues surrounding its practice (1985, 37). 
 
                                                           
16
 James Davidson argues Foucault was informed by a 'Platonic mirage' or false impression of antiquity via his 
examination of comic fragments, vase paintings and Attic oratory (1998, xxiii). Thus he argues the ambivalence 
regarding the topic of women has frustrated some scholars into utilising a 'two-type model' which defines women as 
'wives and the Rest' (1998, 74).  
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First, there was a problem regarding the 'number and frequency of acts' of aphrodisia or how 
often one should engage in acts of pleasure (Foucault 1985, 45). Foucault argues that this 
represents a 'quantitative' concern regarding pleasure which is based on an axis of 'moderation or 
excess' (1985, 44). The notion of moderation and excess is represented by the distinction Plato 
made in the first book of Laws, between self-restraint and self-indulgence. Plato regarded lust as 
an act of excess, in which the individual is driven into a state of distraction for the majority of his 
life. According to Foucault, Plato thought of lust as a 'sickness of the body' or a 'disorder' 
because it could only result in producing systems of excess pleasure or excess pain (1985, 45). 
Cohen in his historical analysis of classical antiquity argues it was not the concept of moderation 
and excess that informed how individuals behaved, rather there existed a 'politics of reputation' 
based on the idea of honour and shame (1991, 200-201). Thus Cohen's work signifies individuals 
were also concerned with what sort of sexual activities were honourable or shameful17. 
 
The second problem Foucault identifies is a concern regarding the actual performance of 
aphrodisia, particularly with sexual acts between couples. He argues that a 'role of polarity' 
existed, in which there was a clear distinction regarding 'the one who performs the activity and 
the one on whom the activity is performed (1985, 46-47). This distinction was based on an axis 
of 'passive' and 'active' roles, in which women, boys and slaves constituted the latter according to 
Foucault (1990, 47). In his historical interpretation, James Davidson, argues Foucault is  
                                                           
17
 David Cohen in Law, Sexuality and Society, describes his studies as 'an exercise in historical legal sociology' in 
which his texts examines why Athenian law 'marked certain forms of sexual and religious behaviour as deviant' 
(1991, 5). Cohen's work demonstrates there were laws during classical antiquity that proscribed certain types of 
behaviour, thus challenging Foucault central hypothesis that no overall authoritarian system existed within this 
historical period. 
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presenting Greek sexual relations as a 'zero-sum game' in which the 'active' or 'masculine' partner 
seeks to dominate the 'passive' or 'subordinate' partner (Davidson, 1998 169-179). Davidson 
suggests this representation of Athenian society is misleading, thus should not be read as factual.  
 
In his overall interpretation, Foucault argues that it was not so much the acts of aphrodisia which 
constituted a moral concern, rather in was the way in which they were practised. In Plato's 
writing, aphrodisia was classified as a natural and necessary act and according to Foucault, 'was 
radically different from the experiences of the flesh that would develop later' (1985, 48). In 
classical antiquity however, Foucault argues that aphrodisia was problematized because of the 
notion of excess and moderation, and passive and active roles within its use. Thus the acts 
themselves are not problematic, rather it was the manner in which they were practised that 
concerned Greek individuals in their sexual experiences. 
 
 
Foucault argues that the second way sex was problematic during this period is reflected in the 
notion of chresis. He claims this term means 'the way in which the individual establishes his 
relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice' (1985, 27). This 
process can be understood as 'the way in which the individual establishes his or her relation to 
moral obligations and rules' (Davidson 1994, 118). Foucault claims that a degree of 'prudence', 
'reflection', and 'calculation' was involved in this practice during classical antiquity, as it was 
not simply a matter of complying to what was permitted or forbidden (1985, 54) The early 
Athenians may well have respected the overall laws and cultural customs of their time, however 
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because they lacked an actual code of behaviour their moral rules were far more ambiguous 
(Foucault 1985, 54). Through an interpretation of texts by Xenophon, Socrates, Aristotle and 
Demosthenes, Foucault argues that there was three 'strategies' or principles individuals 
developed during classical antiquity for dealing with acts of pleasure: need, timeliness and 
status (1985, 54). 
 
Foucault suggests that the lesson of Socrates as put forth by Xenophon, stressed a concern for 
limiting oneself in the practice of aphrodisia 'unless the need were pressing' (1985, 55). The 
objective was not to reduce acts of pleasure from ones life, but rather to 'maintain' them through 
a 'strategy of need' (1985, 54-56). This principle of need 'made possible an equilibrium in the 
dynamics of pleasure and desire' (Foucault 1985, 56). It was seen as an act of moderating oneself 
in acts of pleasure, of not indulging beyond what was deemed necessary or natural. Furthermore 
this strategy of need also encompassed the problem of immoderation, which does not mean 
sexually-deprived but refers to 'seeking sensual pleasures in the gratification of unnatural desires' 
(1985, 57). This is a process in which an individual uses another in order to seek or gratify their 
own unnatural or depraved desires. This particular scenario was deemed immoral or shameful as 
it encompassed a selfishness on behalf of the individual, as it did not constitute as a general and 
natural need worthy of satisfying. 
 
The second strategy in the Athenian use of pleasure is 'timeliness' (Foucault 1985, 57). Foucault 
argues that the act of prudence and calculation in Athenian morality is largely depicted in this 
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principle of timeliness. According to Foucault, Plato in his text Laws, emphasised a concern for 
engaging in acts of pleasure 'at the right time and in the right amount' (1985, 57). He considers 
that this notion of 'the right time' demonstrates a concern for timeliness in Athenian practices of 
pleasures. For instance, it was considered the right time for females to procreate once they 
reached the age of twenty-one. Furthermore sexual intercourse was seen as more favourable and 
productive if it occurred at night. This principle of timeliness was concerned with determining 
the 'opportune time' in which to engage in acts of pleasure (Foucault 1985, 57).  
 
The last strategy was in order to address any issues which could compromise ones 'status' in 
early antiquity (Foucault 1987, 59). Foucault claims that 'standards of sexual morality were 
always tailored to one's way of life' in which individuals like Epicrates and Hiero were advised 
to uphold 'rigorous standards of sexual conduct' as they were important figures of Athenian 
society (Foucault 1985, 60). Thus depending on one's social standing, the incorrect use of 
pleasures could damage one's reputation therefore for some early Greeks and Roman's, 'the art of 
making pleasure also had to be adapted to suit the user and his personal status' (Foucault 1985, 
59). The idea of need, timeliness and status reflects the way 'one had to take different factors into 
account' in their sexual practices (Foucault 1985, 54). Because there was no universal system 
like the Church or State dictating rules and values, Foucault argues that the way of dealing with 
problems associated with sex was through these three strategies of chresis. 
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The third way Foucault perceives sex as problematic during this period is reflected in the notion 
of enkrateia which he describes as the 'ethical work' one performs in order to 'transform oneself 
into the ethical subject of one's behaviour' (1985, 27). This means the 'self-forming activity or 
ethical work that one performs on oneself (Davidson 1994, 114). Thus enkrateia can be 
understood as the ethical work carried out by individual in putting their sexuality into practice. 
Foucault argues that ethical work (in the case of sexual austerity) can include an all-out 
'renunciation of pleasures' or a 'relentless combat' for self-control over the self and desires (1990, 
27) It is this latter form of ethical work that Foucault sees as predominately exercised in early 
antiquity. Moreover, he identifies five ways in which Greek and Greco-Roman's carried out their 
ethical work.  
 
First, Foucault suggests a struggle was involved for early Athenians in their ethical work. 
According to Foucault, this signified that 'one could behave ethically only by adopting a 
combative attitude toward pleasures' (1985, 66). In other words, that in order to exercise sexual 
moderation as opposed to excess, and self-restraint as opposed to self-indulgence, and accord to 
the principles of need, timeliness and status, one must be in a constant state of battle to control 
their sexual desires. 
 
Second, Foucault claims that this battle must be fought within the self. He sees this battle as an 
'agnostic relationship with oneself' in which the body and soul are in conflict (1985, 67). This 
phenomenon is depicted in Plato's Republic. Plato distinguishes the soul into two parts, a 
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stronger/weaker and a better/worse part and suggests one generally opts to obtain the former 
type of soul. Thus Foucault argues that the primary goal in this battle with the self or the soul is 
to acquire victory of 'oneself over oneself' (1985, 69).  
 
Third, Foucault notes that 'the intensity of desire and pleasures did not disappear' but if one could 
'master' the first two components of ethical work, that is, master a combative attitude and master 
inner conflict, then one could speak of 'victory' over oneself (1985, 6). Many Greek figures like 
Plato, Xenophon, Diogenes, Antiphon and Aristotle defined sexual moderation in terms like 
ruling desires, or governing pleasures. Obtaining power over these sensations thus represents the 
'setting up of a solid and stable state of rule of the self over the self' (Foucault 1985, 69). 
 
The fourth way Foucault argues that the ancient Greeks conducted their ethical work was by 
ruling oneself in the same manner of ruling one's wife, one's estate and one's servants (1985, 71). 
Foucault draws on Xenophon's work who describes the disorganised soul as corresponding to a 
disorganised household. This metaphor suggests 'a man would be moderate only insofar as he 
was able to rule his desires as if they were his servants' (Foucault 1985, 70-71). Thus in order to 
rule one's pleasures, one must be able to rule other aspects of one's life such as the family, 
household and business. 
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And lastly, Foucault claims that self-mastery in itself required ongoing training and exercise. In 
classical antiquity, the Greek athlete served as an important reminder to exercise both body and 
mind in order to 'reduce every pleasure to nothing more than the elementary satisfaction of 
needs' (1985, 73). This two-fold training of both body and mind implied that a 'victory over self' 
could be achieved and thus produce a happy and balanced life (Foucault 1985, 73). Foucault 
notes that in order to master ones pleasures, one must first rule the body and mind through 
ongoing training. 
 
The final way in which Foucault sees sex as problematic in classical antiquity is reflected 
through what he terms telos which refers to the process one undergoes in order to establish a 
'moral conduct' (Foucault 1985, 28). Foucault defines this as a process in which 'the individual 
delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice' (1985, 28). Arnold 
Davidson suggests that the term can be understood as the overall 'goal' one seeks in behaving 
ethically (1998, 228). It is an ongoing process in which the individual is committed to a certain 
way of being. In Foucault's opinion, the ultimate goal pursued by the early Greek and Greco-
Roman's was to reach a state of sophrosyne, which is the complete 'self-mastery' and 'self-
restraint' over ones pleasures and desires (1985, 78). However, in order to reach this state, the 
individual must undergo the process of telos in order to obtain the ultimate goal which is 
sophrosyne. The idea of sophrosyne is linked to two ideas: freedom and truth.  
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According to Foucault, the idea of freedom was linked to sophrosyne, as it signified one was not 
a slave to one's pleasures and desires. The greatest danger for the individual was to become 
'bondage' to pleasures, therefore '[t]o be free in relation to pleasures was to be free of their 
authority” (Foucault 1985, 79). For some individuals this state could be reached through fidelity 
in one's marriage or through complete sexual renunciation. In addition, Foucault argues that the 
idea of truth was linked to sophrosyne. He suggests that these two ideas were joined by a 'reason' 
or logos which is 'constitutive of the moderate subject' (1985, 89). McHoul and Grace in their 
critique of Foucault's ethics, suggest that by 'developing ones capacity for self-control, one 
simultaneously develops the capacity for reason', thus 'to rein in one's desires is to bring them 
under control of this form of reason' (1998, 105). It is this form of reasoning or truth that 
Foucault argues is essential for the individual in order to establish a moderate self and 'a life of 
moderation' (1985, 89). 
 
In Foucault's overall interpretation of the ancient texts, he argues that the 'demands of sexual 
austerity' during classical antiquity 'were not organized into a unified, coherent, authoritarian 
moral system that was imposed on everyone in the same manner' (1985, 210). Instead he notes 
that the rules and values associated with sexuality were 'proposed' through 'different styles of 
moderation or strictness' (1985, 21). Because there were no overall universal principles 
proscribed through institutions like the Church or State, Foucault argues sexual activity was 
'constituted, recognized, and organized as a moral issue' (1985, 250).  
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In concluding, Foucault develops his studies on sexuality in classical antiquity by perceiving the 
practice of aphrodisia in classical antiquity as 'problematised' by philosophers and doctors in 
classical Greek culture of the fourth century B.C. He argues that the emphasis in these ancient 
texts was 'to remain free from interior bondage to the passions, to achieve a mode of being that 
could be defined by the full enjoyment of oneself, or the perfect supremacy of oneself over 
oneself' (Foucault 1985, 31). 
 
This chapter has introduced Foucault's concept of 'problematization' which he develops in his 
second volume of The History of Sexuality. It has been demonstrated that Foucault refers to 
'problematization' as a historical method of analysing the process of problem and solution-
making and is the term he assigns to the way in which the early Greek and Greco-Roman's 
understood and practised their sexuality. In addition, this chapter has illustrated how Foucault 
sees sex as problematic in both classical antiquity and early Christianity through a general fear 
of sex, and through a concern surrounding conduct, image and sexual abstinence. Furthermore, 
this discussion has addressed the various ways Foucault sees a 'moral problematization of 
pleasure' developing in classical antiquity. For Foucault there were four problems associated 
with sex during classical antiquity. The first problem concerned moderation and excess in acts of 
aphrodisia. The second problem was with the notion of chresis which emphasised need, 
timeliness and status in one’s sexual activities. The third problem was reflected in the idea of 
enkrateia which encouraged the individual to develop a combative attitude toward acts of 
pleasure. The final problem concerned the manner in which one seeks the goal of self-mastery, 
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freedom and truth or sophrosyne which firstly required the individual to establish a moral self 
through a process of telos. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – Sex and the Self  
 
This remaining chapter discusses Foucault's concepts surrounding sex and the self which he 
develops in his final volume of The History of Sexuality entitled The Care of the Self (1986). 
Foucault argues that a new phenomenon developed in the first and second century A.D which he 
defines as 'the cultivation of the self' (1986, 43). The principle feature of this concept is the idea 
that 'one must take care of oneself' through a variety of external and internal practices (1986, 43). 
In order to do so, the individual must conform to a certain way of living or 'art of living' by 
developing oneself into an 'ethical subject' (Foucault 1986, 67). In addition, Foucault argues that 
this culture of the self caused a 'crisis of the subject' in which the individual was confronted with 
new difficulties in forming their sexual and ethical self (1986, 95). As a result, there was an 
increased 'mistrust of pleasures' which was reflected in three main fields during the time: 
medicine, marriage and erotic literature (Foucault 1986, 9). 
 
The first section of this chapter entitled 'The Care of the Self' will discuss how Foucault 
conceives of a culture of the self developing in the early Christian period. He argues that this 
phenomenon originated in early classical antiquity but had adapted over time. In addition, he 
claims that the care of the self is an ethical practice which closely corresponds to medical 
thought as it includes caring for the body. He further argues that to care for the self is a practice 
that requires work, self-knowledge, and a common goal.  
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The second section of the chapter entitled 'A Crisis of the Sexual Self' will illustrate the ways in 
which Foucault sees a 'crisis of the subject' developing during this historical period (1986, 95). 
First he claims that a pathology of sex developed in medicine which resulted in a strict regimen 
of sexual activities due to the fear of the health problems associated with its practice. Second, 
there was a stronger emphasis on marriage, and the role of the wife. Foucault argues that there 
was an enhanced condemnation toward adultery and sex outside of marriage. Third, because of 
the importance associated with marriage, Foucault concedes that there was a heightened 
disinterest toward the love of boys (1986, 189). Foucault argues that the changing attitudes 
toward boys and love created a new erotics which emphasised heterogeneous love over that of 
boys and men (1986, 228).  
 
The Care of the Self  
 
Foucault argues that in the first and second century A.D, a new phenomenon developed which he 
terms 'the cultivation of the self' (1986, 43). He stresses the underlying principle of this 
phenomenon is the idea 'that says one must take care of themselves' by 'testing oneself, 
examining oneself, monitoring oneself in a series of clearly defined exercises' (1986, 43, 68). 
Stated in an interview with Fornet-Betancourt, Becker and Gomez-Muller, Foucault claims that 
the care of the self is an ethical practice in which 'individual liberty' and 'civic liberty' are 
combined to produce a certain way of living or 'art of living' ([1984] 1994, 4; Foucault 1986, 45).  
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The goal of caring for the self is to acquire what is commonly known as 'the good life' 
(Wolfgang Detel 2005, 93-94). In his analysis of Foucault's third volume, Wolfgang Detel18 
argues that the care of the self is an 'ancient dietetics' in which the primary aim was not to 
prolong life, but rather optimise 'the quality of life' which means to maximise 'pleasurable health 
within natural bounds' (2005, 9). Foucault argues that the care of the self originated in classical 
antiquity, however he asserts that overtime 'the relationship with the self' had 'intensified' (1986, 
45). Foucault identifies five elements that created the phenomenon that one must care of the self. 
 
First, the idea of caring for the self is found in a variety of first and second century philosophical 
texts. In reference to authors such as Zeno, Musonius, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus and 
Plutarch, Foucault argues the caring for oneself is depicted within these texts as a practice of 
'taking care of the soul' in which 'man must attend to himself' (1986, 46-47). Such examples 
include Epicureans ideas stating that 'the principle of philosophy should be considered as a 
permanent exercise of the care of oneself' as well as Apuleius's emphasis on 'cultivating the soul' 
(Foucault 1986, 46). Foucault stresses that the care of the self is considered a permanent and life-
long practice and suitable to all individuals of all ages by quoting Epicurus who states, 'It is 
never too early or too late to care for the well-being of the soul' (1986, 48). 
 
Second, to care for the self requires work or 'labor' in which a 'whole set of occupations' are 
                                                           
18 Wolfgang Detel argues that the purpose of Foucault's discussion on ancient dietetics is primarily to demonstrates 
how his 'ethics programme worked' (2005, 94).  
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employed by the individual in order to become an ethical person (1986, 50). Foucault sees this 
process occurring in a variety of way. For instance, setting aside time in order to contemplate or 
reflect on ones life, or memorising 'useful principles' in inspirational texts, or to 'interrupt one's 
ordinary activities and go into retreat' (Foucault 1986, 50). Additionally, this practice also 
involves strengthening one's relationship with family and friends. Because the care of the self 
also requires caring for others, McHoul and Grace argue 'it is much more social art than the 
ascetics of Plato and Xenophon' in classical antiquity (1998, 106)19. 
 
Third, the care of the self is in 'close correlation with medical thought and practice' (1986, 54). In 
other words, the care of the self corresponds to the notion of caring for the body. For Foucault 
'[a] whole series of medical metaphors is regularly employed to designate the operations 
necessary for the care of the soul' (1986, 55). For example, Epicurus treated his philosophical 
school as a 'dispensary of the soul' in which students were considered 'patients' with varying 
degrees of ailments requiring treatment. For Foucault, this process of treating the mind like a 
sick body is necessary 'because diseases of the soul – unlike those of the body – do not announce 
themselves' and as a result 'can go undetected for a long time' (1986, 58).  
 
The individual also requires 'self-knowledge' in order to take care of the self (Foucault 1986, 58). 
Foucault claims that this is a process in which individuals test and examine themselves so as to  
                                                           
19
 McHoul and Grace in their guide on Foucault's overall work, argue his final volume on sexuality was still an 
'ethical enquiry' on the 'internal relationship of the self to the self' however they argue his analysis was primarily 'an 
investigation of forms of controls' that determine the sexual self (1998, 92) 
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develop a self-awareness. For instance, individuals like Epicurus experimented with forms of 
deprivation in order to gauge his level of tolerance, discomfort and so forth. Epicurus would 
practice fasting in order 'to see how much his pleasure diminished' (Foucault 1986, 59). For the 
Stoics, 'it was a matter of preparing oneself for possible privations' that may occur in the future 
(Foucault 1986, 59). Thus by depriving the body of various substances or activities, the 
individual would develop a self-awareness and knowledge which would aid in caring for the self. 
 
And lastly, the care of the self involves seeking a 'common goal' which is the 'conversion to self' 
according to Foucault (1986, 64). He describes this as a two-fold process in that once the 
individual has succeeded in mastering all their 'dependences and enslavements', they are enabled 
to 'delight in oneself' (1986, 65)20. Foucault claims that '[t]he individual who has finally 
succeeded in gaining access to himself is, for himself, an object of pleasure' (1986, 66). McHoul 
and Grace argue that the goal to dominate the self had not changed much since classical 
antiquity, however these later philosophers added the new aspect of 'enjoyment' to their goal 
(1998, 106). Thus once the individual has mastered their desires, the practice of caring for the 
self becomes a pleasurable experience. Foucault claims the care of the self was a phenomenon 
that developed at the same time that civil law (under the jurisdiction of Augustus) was promoting 
marriage, protecting the family and condemning adultery (1986, 40). However, the restructuring 
of political policies and legislation during this era was designed primarily to increase the 
responsibilities of each individual citizen thus creating a society in which 'one must take care of  
                                                           
20
 Clare O'Farrel in her interpretation of this historical period suggests that this 'culture' intended to 'help individuals 
free themselves from enslaving desires, to allow them to become masters of themselves and to lead a beautiful life 
which would be an example to others' (2006, 48). 
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oneself' (Foucault 1986, 43). In his critique of Foucault's three volumes on sexuality, Barry 
Smart claims that Foucault was attempting to 'represent a different form of moral 
problematization' than in classical antiquity (1991, 210). Smart argues that Foucault's final 
volume is 'not an accentuation of taboos' rather it is an analysis of how individuals developed 'a 
style of conduct that revolves around the question of the self' (1991, 210). 
 
A Crisis of the Sexual Self 
 
Foucault argues that the consequence of this particular phenomenon caused a 'crisis of the 
subject' in which the individual was confronted with an entirely new set of difficulties to take 
into account in forming the self into an 'ethical subject' (1986, 67). Foucault claims that this 
crisis of the self is reflected in the way one sought 'self-mastery' over the self, over the household 
and over others (Foucault 1986, 95). In addition, he suggests that '[i]t was against the 
background of this cultivation of the self' in which 'a more intense problematization of the 
aphrodisia' developed (1986, 39, 67).  
 
Arnold Davidson argues that this increased emphasis on sexual austerity should not be 
interpreted as the beginning of proscriptive rules and regulations determining the individual's 
sexuality. Rather, it is an ethical process that requires the individual to continually adapt their 
attitude and actions in order to 'constantly take care of oneself' (1994, 120). Foucault claims that 
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this increased anxiety concerning the sexual self is depicted in the text of Soranus, Rufus, 
Mosonius and Seneca (1986, 39). Barry Smart further emphasises that these texts 'do not take the 
form of plans for a general legislation or restraint of sexual behaviour but the encouragement of 
even more austerity on the part of the individuals' (1995, 115).  
 
Foucault argues that the consequence of this increased concerned for sexual austerity changed 
the way in which individuals experienced their sexuality. He claims that there was a 'mistrust of 
the pleasure, an emphasis on their abuse for the body and soul, a valorization of marriage and 
marital obligations' and 'a disaffection regard to spiritual meaning imputed to the love of boys' 
(1986, 9). As such, he claims that this mistrust of the pleasures had a unique effect in three main 
areas: the body and medicine, the wife and the household, and lastly boys and erotic literature. 
The following will illustrate how Foucault perceives these three developments taking place. 
 
Foucault notes that the first area in which changes developed in the first and second century was 
in the field of medicine. There was a more 'tighter structuring of life', and more vigilant attention 
directed toward the body by doctors like Galen, Marcus Aurelius and Rufus (Foucault 1986, 
103). McHoul and Grace, claim that ancient medicine was very different from what we now 
know, as there was 'little emphasis on correction and cure' rather the point was to integrate 
medicine into the 'management of health and the life of the body' (1998, 107). In addition, 
Foucault suggests that there developed an increased fear concerning sex because of its 'many 
connections with disease and with evil' (1986, 237). He identifies four specific developments that 
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took place in the field of medicine: pathology, complex pathology, sexual therapeutics and the 
positive effects of sexual abstention. All of these developments had an effect on the individual in 
constituting their sexual self. 
 
The first development to take place was a 'pathology of sexual activity'. According to Foucault, 
early physicians like Artaeus including Galen looked upon sex as a practice which could cause 
'disease' (1986, 113-114). In addition, a pathology of sexual activity could take two forms. First, 
there is the disease that is 'marked by a constant excitation' in which sexual release is never 
complete (Foucault 1986, 113). Such a disease included satyriasis or priapism in which there is 
an excess, or often uncontrollable sexual desire by a man which at times can be painful. Foucault 
claims that 'the patient is in a state of constant convulsion, traversed by extreme attacks, which 
closely resemble epilepsy' (1986, 113). A further disease within this category includes hysteria 
which is understood as a complaint chiefly concerning women. The second pathology of sexual 
activity included what Foucault describes as 'unlimited expenditure' or 'a continuous discharge of 
semen without erection of the penis' (1986, 115). Foucault argues that the Greeks called this 
gonorrhoea and considered it a 'shameful disease' because it leads to loss of strength, premature 
ageing and led 'inevitably to death' (Foucault 1986, 115-116). 
 
The second development to take place was a 'complex pathology' of sexual acts (Foucault, 1986, 
116). According to Foucault the sexual act itself became associated with 'an abundance of 
diverse factors' in which one should consider the time, the climate, bodily temperature, and 
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quality and content of food one has digested before engaging in sexual acts (1986, 116). Foucault 
argues that this represents the sexual act as 'fragile in which 'the least deviation, the least malaise, 
risks perturbing them' (1986, 116). Thus a variety of possible illnesses could occur by deviating 
from the medical norm. In citing Greco-Roman physician Rufus, Foucault lists such possible 
ailments as: 'digestive disorder, a weakening of sight and hearing, a general weakness of the 
sense organs, and memory loss, convulsive trembling, pains of the joint, a stabbing pain in the 
side...' and so forth (1986, 117). Foucault notes that all this complication with sexual activities 
signified that sexual acts 'must therefore be placed under an extremely careful regimen' (1996, 
124). 
 
The third development to take place was that sexuality became a 'source of therapeutic effects' 
(Foucault 1986, 118). Thus the sexual act not only produces illness but is thought to have healing 
properties as well. For instance, sex was seen as therapeutic for certain illnesses like 'diseases 
due to phlegm' or that sex can cure respiratory illnesses, it can increase the appetite, and appease 
aggressive behaviour (Foucault 1986, 118). According to Foucault, the central debate during that 
time concerned the health effects of sexual activity and children. Some doctors, like Rufus 
believed epilepsy and headaches would cease once a child had his his or first sexual experience 
whereas Aretaeus objected to this theory believing it 'violates the designs of Nature' and 'because 
it produces or prolongs the disease it aims to cure' (Foucault 1986, 120). 
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The final development Foucault sees taking place regarding sexuality was the 'positive effects of 
sexual abstention' (1986, 129). For Foucault, doctors like Artaeus stressed the importance of 
sexual abstinence for men because a high value was placed on sperm (spermatic humor). Artaeus 
argued sexual renunciation developed men into 'courageous' beings who became 'bold, daring, 
and strong as wild beasts' (Foucault 1986, 121). He applied this particular practice to athletes and 
animals, and argued those men or beasts who 'keep their sperm' become 'superior in strength'. 
Galen however saw dangers for men who suddenly practice abstinence after years of engaging in 
sexual activity. According to Foucault, Galen believed men became 'dull and inactive' and 
obtained a 'sad and hopeless expression of their faces' which he associated with melancholy 
(1986, 120-121). In addition, the positive effects of sexual abstinence was not applied to women, 
as it was seen as their destiny to marry and procreate. Foucault argues that sex was not seen as 
'evil' nor was sexual abstinence a 'duty', rather there was an increased concern regarding the 
health effects of sexual activities on the body (1986, 122). 
 
As a result of these four developments, Foucault claims that sex was 'placed under an extremely 
careful regimen' (1986, 124). This regime is not prescriptive as there was no actual defining of 
what was permissible or prohibited sexual acts. According to Foucault, 'four variables' are 
discussed by the early doctors: 'the auspicious occasion for procreation, the age of the subject, 
the time frame (the season or hour of the day), and the individual temperament' (1986, 125). The 
following discussion will highlight these variables which Foucault argues constitutes a regimen 
of sexual acts.  
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First, Foucault argues that a 'regimen of the aphrodisia and procreation' developed in which 
special attention was placed on the how the couple should prepare for sexual reproduction. 
Foucault stresses that there involved 'a general conditioning of the body and soul' because any 
possible 'disorders of conception' would be reflected in one's offspring (1986, 125). For example, 
Athenaeus emphasised that before copulation took place, the body must be free of illness and 
fatigue and the soul must be 'tranquil' and free of worries (Foucault 1986, 125). Furthermore, 
there was an emphasis on sexual abstinence before copulation as this allowed the male's sperm to 
develop strength and potency. For women it was favourable to wait until just after menstruation 
finished. Foucault notes that there was a further concern regarding ones diet prior to procreating. 
For instance, women were encouraged not to drink alcohol because the child would come to 
resemble her state of mind during the act. In addition, both man and woman should purify their 
bodies and only eat small amounts of food so as not to develop indigestion before the sexual act 
commenced. McHoul and Grace argue that '[t]hese prohibitions are familiar enough today' 
however the similarity ends when it comes to advising 'against sex during menstruation' (1998, 
109-110). 
 
Second, Foucault claims that there was a concern regarding the 'age of the subject' in which 
sexual activity 'must neither be continued too long nor begun to early' (1986, 128). For example, 
sexual intercourse was seen as detrimental to one's health if it occurred too early or too late in 
one's life. Athenaeus stressed that boys under the age of fourteen have not yet reached puberty 
therefore their bodies are not equipped to deal with sexual intercourse as they will tire easily and 
'repress their desires from the beginning' (Foucault 1986, 129). Adolescent females were advised 
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by doctors like Soranus that sex and child-bearing 'could occur as soon as menstruation was 
regularly established' (1986, 129). 
 
Foucault argues that the early doctors saw winter and spring as the appropriate season in which 
to procreate thus a regimen was developed around the notion of a 'favourable time' (1986, 130). 
He notes that there were many discussions concerning what time of the year and what time of the 
day couples should copulate. For instance, Plutarch recommended to couples to not have sexual 
intercourse in the middle of the night nor in the morning because 'there still may be food ill-
digested in the stomach' (Foucault 1986, 131). Doctors like Galen and Rufus suggested nature 
reflected the appropriate time in which to engage in sexual activities. They saw night-time as the 
appropriate and natural time in which to copulate because the 'women retains sperm better while 
sleeping' (Foucault 1986, 131). 
 
And lastly Foucault argues that a regimen developed during the fourth century regarding 
'[i]ndividual temperaments' in relation to sexuality activities (1986, 132). He notes that Rufus 
emphasised that the body should be at a certain temperature during sexual intercourse. For 
instance, the body should be 'more or less hot and moist' and not 'cold and dry' and individuals 
should engage in exercise and good eating to ensure their bodies are in an optimum state 
(Foucault 1986, 132). Furthermore, Foucault argues that there was an overall emphasis on 
'balance' in which individuals should exercise 'neither too fast nor too slow' in which positive 
activities included walking and horse-riding but not javelin throwing and hot baths because the  
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body would heat up and cool down too quickly (1986, 132). 
 
Foucault concludes that these regimen were concerned entirely with the body with an emphasis 
on its 'condition', 'its balances' and 'its ailments' (1986, 133). He sees this as a process in which 
one must take all necessary precautions in order to 'determine the conditions that least affect the 
whole combinations of balances' (1986, 125). Foucault claims that all these particulars 
concerning sex, health, and the body may give the impression that the 'sexual ethics' of the 
Christian period, including our contemporary science on sex developed from this early field of 
medicine. However he argues that the 'fundamental differences' was the ways in which 
individuals integrated these 'precepts' into their everyday life. McHoul and Grace argue that 
'Foucault's lesson is clear: don't make history out of easy similarities; make it out of difficult 
differences' (1998, 111)21. 
 
Foucault argues that the second area in which changes developed in the first and second century 
was with marriage, the household and the role of the wife. He claims that in the texts of classical 
antiquity, the topic of marriage was secondary to larger social issues like the household and the 
laws and customs of the city (1985, 147). However in the texts of the first and second century, 
the topic of marriage 'became a more insistent and more often debated question than in the past'  
                                                           
21
 McHoul and Grace argue that Foucault does not provide a 'definitive theory on anything' because his 
investigations are 'conceptual' rather than theoretical. They further claim that Foucault does philosophy as an 
'interrogative practice rather than as a search for essentials' (1998, vii-viii) 
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(Foucault 1986, 14). There was 'an attempt to define a mode of coexistence between husband and 
wife' which caused an 'ethics of strict marriage' to develop (Foucault 1986, 150,166). Historical 
scholars Cohen and Saller argue that Foucault saw this process as the beginning of 'the 
universalization of marriage' in which marriage became a social norm (1994, 44)22. Foucault 
argues that this phenomenon developed in three ways: marriage became a 'dual relation' a 
'universal relation' and lastly a 'singular relation' (1986, 150-160). 
 
 
Foucault notes that in the first and second century, the Stoics adopted the ancient Greek and 
Greco-Roman notion in which marriage is seen as natural 'by virtue of its two-fold contribution 
to procreation and community life' (Foucault 1986, 151) However he argues that the Stoics 
modified this by placing a stronger emphasis on the 'communal' aspect of marriage. Rufus for 
instance, stressed that marriage was not entirely a procreative affair and this particular perception 
could not justify why one would get married. For Rufus, the importance of marriage was the 
'companionship' it provided between husband and wife in whom they could develop care, 
kindness and attentiveness toward one another (Foucault 1986, 151). Foucault argues that this 
particular perception caused marriage to become a 'dual relation' in which an emphasis is placed 
not so much on the procreative importance of marriage but rather on the communal benefits 
marriage provides. 
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 Cohen and Saller argue that Foucault's representation of marriage in classical antiquity is 'misleading in important 
respects' because he fails to acknowledge that marriage was not always an 'affectionless bond formed only by those 
with status and property at stake' (1994, 46) 
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Furthermore Foucault claims that the Stoics placed a greater emphasis on the importance of 
getting married by perceiving it as a 'duty' (1986, 155). He notes that the notion of duty was 
developed in two ways. First, the Stoics believed marriage was essentially 'natural and rational' 
and should not 'be evaded by any human being who acknowledges himself to be a member of a 
community and a part of the human race' (Foucault 1986, 155). Second, marriage was seen as a 
'universal occupation' in which even philosophers of the time should commit to. According to 
Foucault, the rationale underlying this perception was that philosophers should set themselves as 
an example to others, because if they avoided marriage they would be perceived as not 'obeying 
reason' and 'following' what nature had intended (1986, 157). Foucault argues that this 
demonstrates that marriage became a 'universal relation' as well (1986, 154). 
 
Lastly, Foucault argues that the philosophers of the first and century century saw marriage as a 
'singular relation' which combined two people to form a single entity (1986, 159). This particular 
perception developed from an 'adjustment of specific roles' in which the husband was expected 
to do tasks the wife couldn't do and the wife was expected to do tasks the husband could not do 
(Foucault 1986, 160). The husband and wife were perceived as developing an equilibrium or 
balance by having 'the same goal' which was the 'prosperity of the household' (Foucault 1986, 
160). In addition, Foucault claims that marriage was seen as the most important relation that 
could develop between two people, such that it was greater in strength than other relations such 
as those of brothers, friends and parents to their children (Foucault 1986, 159).  
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Foucault argues that these particular perceptions of marriage 'granted both sexes, if not identical 
aptitudes, an equal capability of virtue' (1986, 161). Thus the role of the wife was significantly 
more important than what it was in classical antiquity. McHoul and Grace claim that, '[a] man's 
wife ceased to be simply one of the “objects” of his control and became, instead, what we might 
now call a ''significant other''' (1998, 112). In addition, Foucault claims that the changes 
occurring within marriage caused a stronger emphasis on 'heterogeneous relationships' rather 
than blood relationships or friendships (1986, 163). He argues that the strengthening of the 
marital unit developed in two ways: through a condemnation of sex outside of marriage and a 
condemnation of adultery. 
 
According to Foucault, the principle which condemns sex outside of marriage was depicted in 
the philosophical writings of Marcus Aurelius, who stressed that sexual intercourse must be 
restricted to marriage23. This principle was based on the idea that 'all sexual relations are 
culpable if they did not take place in the relationships of marriage that makes them legitimate' 
(Foucault 1986, 167). This idea originated in classical antiquity in which to practice sexual 
fidelity was to master oneself and one's desire. However, these later philosophers were becoming 
increasingly strict by criticising all sexual activities that occurred outside of marriage. Foucault 
argues that it was not the sexual act itself that was offensive rather it was the 'debauchery' it 
inflicted on the institution of marriage (1986, 170). 
 
                                                           
23 Cohen and Saller note that Foucault fails to acknowledge that Marcus Aurelius took a concubine following the 
death of his wife (1994, 46)  
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In addition, Foucault argues that a 'problematization' of adultery developed during the first and 
second century A.D (1986, 171). In classical antiquity, adultery was understood as 'extramarital 
sexual relations' in which the married man engaged in sexual relations with a married women, 
and the shame or 'injustice' was seen as occurring to the wife's husband (1987, 171). However, 
by the first and second century, the shame of adultery was positioned upon the husband who 
committed adultery and was further dispersed upon his wife. McHoul and Grace claim that 
marriage was seen as the 'natural home of sex', and that extramarital sex might harm the husband 
because if found out, it would threaten the civic status of his wife (1998, 113). In contrast, 
Foucault argues that sexual fidelity was 'defined less by a law than by a style of relation to the 
wife, by a way of being and of behaving with respect to her' (1986, 173). 
 
On the topic of marriage, Foucault concludes that the first and second century texts define a 
'certain model of relationships between spouses' but not in any institutional or legal form (1986, 
150). A 'conjugalization of sexual relations' developed in which an emphasis was placed on not 
seeking pleasure outside of marriage (Foucault 1986, 166). This is because marriage itself was a 
'bond formed between two spouses' and as such, it ruled out finding pleasure elsewhere (Foucault 
1986, 166). Foucault stresses that in the early Christian period, 'marriage constitutes for human 
beings the only legitimate context for sexual union and the experience of aphrodisia' (1986, 
170). Due to this particular phenomenon, Foucault argues that the privilege once granted to the 
love of boys was diminished because of the emphasis placed on the importance of marriage and 
sexual fidelity.  
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The final area that Foucault sees changes developing in the first and second century is in regards 
to love and boys (1986, 192). The love of boys had been an important topic in early 
philosophical discussions, however it ceased to be of much interest to the later philosophers. The 
practice of pederasty never ceased but what changed was the manner in which 'one questioned 
oneself about it' (Foucault 1986, 189). In effect, Foucault argues that the love of boys became 
associated with the love of women. He isolates two early texts to emphasise how the love of boys 
had lost its 'intensity' thus creating a 'deproblematization' of boys as objects of pleasure (1986, 
189). 
 
The first text by Plutarch entitled Dialogue on Love is about a man called Bacchon who is being 
pursued by both a man and a woman. Bacchon turns to his elders for advise and what follows is a 
dialogue between Proteogenes and Pisias 'who advocate the love of boys' and Anthemion and 
Daphnaeus who favours the love of women (Foucault 1986, 194). Plutarch attempts to create a 
'unitary erotics' based on the relationship between man and woman which 'ultimately excludes 
the love of boys, for it lacks charis' or grace, and the debate between each man ultimately 
favours the love of women over boys (Foucault 1986, 210). 
 
The second text entitled Affairs of the Heart by Lucian, focuses on Theomnestus, who loves both 
men and women equally but cannot decide which of the two deserve his attention more. 
Theomnestus asks Lycinus who has a text which consists of two orators discussing the matter. 
Lycinus decides in favour of the orator who praises the love of boys because it is 'practised by 
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philosophers... and it pledges itself to the ties of friendship that are just and undefiled' (Foucault 
1986, 226). Foucault argues that the resolution (which favours heterosexual relations) in the text 
is 'a syncretic conclusion' which favours marriage, and that the love of boys is reserved only to 
philosophers (1986, 226). He claims that acts of pederasty are presented as a practice exclusive 
to philosophers thus it gives everyone else 'not only the right but duty to marry' (Foucault 1986, 
226). 
 
Foucault argues that these two texts demonstrate a 'new erotics' developing in the early Christian 
period in which 'the relationship between man and woman found its expression in romances' 
(1986, 228). He notes that the themes within these romances become the central characteristics 
of the erotic or romances that followed in which an emphasis is placed upon 'the existence of a 
"heterosexual" relation marked by a male-female polarity' (1986, 228). 'The love of a boy is 
never the principle objective of the narrative' rather the 'whole focus of attention is centred on the 
relationship of the boy and the girl' (Foucault 1986, 229). In addition, he argues that these texts 
emphasise the importance of virginity, not as a social expectation, but rather a choice or 'style of 
life' (1986, 230). Foucault concludes that these texts are organised around the 'reciprocal 
relationship of a man and a woman... the high values attributed to virginity, and around the 
complete union in which it finds perfection' (1986, 232). 
 
The central argument Foucault develops in The Care of the Self is that a 'whole corpus of moral 
reflection on sexual activity and its pleasures seems to mark, the first centuries of our era, a 
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certain strengthening of austerity themes' (1986, 235). He argues that this phenomenon is evident 
by the way doctors worried about the health effects sexual activities had on the body, on how 
philosophers condemned extramarital relations preferring strict sexual fidelity between husband 
and wife, and by the overall disinterest concerning the love of boys in philosophical discussion 
(1986, 235).  
 
This chapter has introduced Foucault's concept of 'the care of the self' which he sees as a 
phenomenon developing in the first two centuries following the death of Christ. For Foucault, the 
central principle underlying this concept is individuals must take care of themselves through both 
physically and spiritually training, and to develop a self-awareness and self-knowledge which 
will produce a goal in which to seek. Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated how Foucault 
believes a 'crisis of the subject' developed alongside the many changes taking place during the 
time. The individual had to develop a new ethical and sexual self in order to process the changes 
occurring within medicine, marriage and erotics. And lastly, this chapter has demonstrated 
Foucault's central thesis, in that doctors and philosophers during this period were urging 
individuals to practice self-cultivation and exercise austerity in all matters pertaining to one’s 
sexual activities. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has offered a discussion on the central concepts that Michel Foucault develops in his 
The History of Sexuality project. It has been demonstrated that Foucault devises a number of 
approaches toward understanding the experience of sexuality throughout various historical 
periods. His work is comprised of examining sexuality in classical antiquity, early Christianity 
and in the later half of the twentieth-century. In addition, his work explores the effects that power 
and ethics have in determining the sexual self. This thesis has also included a number of 
scholarly citations that were aimed to enhance the readers understanding of the debates 
surrounding Foucault's work. 
 
Chapter One included a discussion of Foucault's concept of the 'repressive hypothesis' which he 
develops in the first volume of his project (1990, 10). It has been demonstrated that Foucault 
believes that the history of modern sexuality is understood to be one of repression. He develops a 
critique of this perception of sexual repression and argues that pre-industrial society was 
considered an era in which sexual liberty existed. In addition, this chapter has demonstrated the 
four faults that Foucault finds with this historical narrative. He criticises the repressive 
hypothesis for situating the beginning of sexual repression with the rise of economic capitalism 
in the seventeen-century. In addition, he argues that the repressive hypothesis utilises a 'discourse 
of oppression' to substantiate that sexual repression is a reality in the modern world (1990, 7). He 
further finds fault with individuals who support the repressive hypothesis by arguing they are 
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provided with 'speaker's benefits' (1990, 6). And lastly, this chapter has illustrated how Foucault 
finds fault with the idea that power is an exclusively repressive force that ultimately represses 
sexualities. Chapter One has demonstrated that Foucault sees the idea of sexual repression as 
influencing the modern individual in their understanding of sexuality 
 
Chapter two has offered a discussion on Foucault's concept of 'bio-power' and its impact on 
sexuality which he develops in his first volume (1990, 143). It has been demonstrated that 
Foucault sees a new power developing in the seventeen-century which he terms 'bio-power' 
(1990, 143). It has been shown that Foucault sees bio-power as creating the industrial revolution 
in the seventeen-century. He claims that without a power controlling individuals and the 
population, the capitalist economy would never have developed. In addition it has been 
illustrated that Foucault rejects the idea that a sexual repression developed from the seventeen-
century onward. Rather he sees new types of sexualities developing when the medical and 
political community defined what was normal as opposed to abnormal regarding sex and 
sexualities. In addition, chapter two has demonstrated that Foucault sees this increase of 
sexualities as developing through an attack on 'the masturbating child, the hysterical women, the 
Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult' (1990, 105). Chapter Two has demonstrated that 
Foucault perceives that the effects of power can influence the way in which the individual 
experiences their sexuality. 
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In Chapter Three, it has been shown that Foucault sees sex as problematic in ancient antiquity 
and early Christianity. He articulates this perception in his second volume on the history of 
sexuality. Foucault sees a fear surrounding sex in both historical periods which he argues 
represents a 'problematization' of sexuality ([1984] 1991, 384). Problematization is the term 
Foucault devises in order to describe the way in which individuals create problems and devise 
solutions. In addition, this chapter has demonstrated that Foucault argues that the problems with 
sex differ between these two historical periods. He claims that the early Christians were 
informed by the rules and regulations of the Church, thus the way they experienced sexuality was 
influenced by the teachings of Christ. The early Greeks however had no authoritarian system in 
place thus they were informed by the ethical teachings of the period. Foucault argues that 
because of this lack of standardised rules, individuals during classical antiquity experienced 
sexuality through 'practices of the self' which emphasised moderation, self-restraint and self-
mastery over all matters pertaining to sexual activities. Chapter Three has illustrated the way in 
which Foucault sees ethics as influencing how individuals experienced their sexuality in classical 
Greek and Rome.  
 
Chapter Four has discussed Foucault's concepts surrounding the self and sex in the first and 
second century A.D. In Foucault's final volume, he perceives a new phenomenon developing 
during this time which stressed that 'one must take care of oneself' through various practices 
(1986, 43, 68). It has been demonstrated that Foucault perceives this phenomenon emerging in a 
time when the state was emphasising the importance of marriage. Foucault argues that because 
of a culture that stressed one must care for the self, there developed a 'crisis' for the individual in 
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regards to how to behave ethically and sexually (1986, 95). He claims that this crisis is depicted 
in the changes that developed in three main areas, notably medicine, marriage and erotics. He 
concludes that there was an increased emphasis on sexual austerity because of the illnesses 
associated with sex and that there was a further emphasis on marriage as opposed to adultery. 
Lastly Foucault claims that there was an importance assigned to heterosexual relations over 
relations such as the love for boys. He claims that this was represented in the ancient erotics of 
the time. Chapter Four has demonstrated the impact that medicine, marriage and erotics play in 
how early Christian and Roman's experienced their sexuality.  
 
In concluding, this thesis has provided a discussion on the various concepts Michel Foucault 
develops in his The History of Sexuality project. This thesis has intended to demonstrate that his 
various concepts concerning sex and sexuality are a unique and useful source that may contribute 
to those who wish to study this field. Through his own style of historical analysis, Foucault 
provides a compelling and often challenging way in which the contemporary individual can 
approach the study of sexuality.  
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